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SECTION 1983: AGENT OF PEACE OR VEHICLE 
OF VIOLENCE AGAINST CHILQREN? 
SUSAN H. BITENSKY* 
Sir, a Government . . . that cannot snatch from oppression the 
feeblest. . . child, is not a Government. It is wanting in the vital 
attribute of government. The power to protect its people inheres 
indestructibly in all Governments, and that frame of constitution or laws 
which does not provide for it fails to establish government. 
- Senator William Darrah Kelleyl 
Sir, this bill is a measure of peace . . . . 
- Senator David Perley Lowe2 
Introduction 
One of the more despicable badges of slavery in the antebellum South was a 
lacerated back. It was nothing remarkable - indeed, it was customary practice for 
slaveholders to whip their African American "property" with impunity.3 Apparently 
slaveholders believed that violence would beget compliance and surely would not 
offend moral or legal precepts because the victims were, after all, slaves. Although 
the Civil War ended slavery, it turned out that this old habit died very hard. Newly 
freed slaves still frequently received the lash: especially if they were economically 
C 2001 Susan H. Bitensky 
.. Professor of Law, Michigan Stale University-Detroit College of Law. B.A. 1971, Case Western 
Reserve University; J.D. 1974, University of Chicago Law School. I am most appreciative of the 
comments and advice given on earlier drafts of this article by Professors David Achtenberg and Steven 
L. Winter. The research assistance of Jeffrey Canja, Christopher Stickland, and Sharon Swietek-Madden 
was invaluable. This article is dedicated to my sister, Nidia Henderson, and my niece, Maxine Lynch. 
1. CONGo GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 339 (1871). 
2. CONGo GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 376 (1871). 
3. Everette Swinney, Supprtssing the Ku Klux Klan: The Enforctment of the Reconstruction 
Amtndmtnts 1870-1877, in AMERICAN LEGAL AND CONSTInmONAL HISTORY: A GARLAND SERIES OF 
OtrrsTANDING DISSERTATIONS 36-37 (1987) (stating that the lash was the primary means of controlling 
slaves); ERIC FONER, RECoNSTRUcnON: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REvOLUTION, 1863-1877, at 78 (1988) 
(explaining that many fonner slaves defined freedom as "abolition of punishment by the lash"). For 
further descriptions of the flogging of slaves, see JOHN W. BLASSINGAME, THE SLAVE COMMUNITY: 
PLANTATION LIFE IN nm ANT'EBEll.UM SOUTl{ 251 (1979); FREDERICK DoUGLASS, THE LIFE AND TiMES 
OF FREDERICK DoUGLASS 52, 121 (Rayford W. Logan ed., Bonanza Books 1962) (1892); 4 PAGE SMrm, 
THE NATION COMES OF AGE: A PEoPLE'S HISTORY OFnm ANTE-Bsu.UM YEARS 585, 6]5-16 (1981); 
Aremona G. Bennett, Frttdom: Personal Ubtrty and Private Law: Phantom Freedom: Official 
Acceptanct of Violence to Ptrsonal Security and Subversion of Proprietary Rights and Ambitions 
Following Emancipation, 1865-1910,70 CHI-KENT L. REV. 439,440 (1994). 
4. See DoNALD G. NIEMAN, To SlIT mE LAw IN MonON: THE FREEDMAN'S BUREAU AND nm 
333 
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successful or if they dared to exercise their political and legal rights.5 As one 
observer described upon touring the newly defeated South, corporal punishment of 
blacks remained a "'habit so inveterate with a great many persons as to render, on 
the least provocation, the impulse to whip a negro almost irresistible."'6 
During Reconstruction, the Ku Klux Klan and other vigilante groups played a 
preeminent role in terrorizing the black population as well as those whites who were 
foes of an old guard still wedded to slavery and notions of white supremacy.7 
These renegade groups intimidated and assaulted entire black families, including 
children.8 The Klan preyed upon its enemies with a standard repertoire of 
shootings, lynchings, and Whippings, in addition to more ghoulishly inventive 
crimes.9 Whipping, however, appears to have continued from the days of slavery 
as a favorite, if not almost reflexive, means of coercing black Southerners. III 
To the modern student of mid-nineteenth century America, this history of 
violence against blacks is appalling, yet unsurprising. It is unsurprising because 
slaveholders attributed to blacks a subhuman status" and because many southern 
LEGAL RIGHTS OF BLACKS, 1865-1868, at 14, 25, 40, 42, 44, 124 (1979); GEORGE C. RABLE, BUT 
THERE WAS NO PEACE: THE ROLE OF VIOLENCE IN THE POLITICS OF RECONSTRUCfION 72-73 (1984); 
ALLEN W. TRELEASE, WHITE TERROR: THE Ku KLUX KLAN CONSPIRACY AND SOUTHERN RECONSTRUC-
TION 29, 33, 35, 85, 87, 101, 124-25, 130, 176, 211, 227, 235, 247, 269, 271, 276, 281, 306, 311-12, 
315,330-31,337,354,356,359,360,365,370,372 (1971); Swinney, supra note 3, at 51-52, 208-09, 
217-18,279. 
5. See TRELEASE, supra note 4, at 29, 118. 130, 150. 176-77, 227. 235, 262-63. 265. 303, 354. 
359, 360. 366. 
6. I Carl Schurz, Report on the Condition of the South, in SPEECHES, CORRESPONDENCE AND 
POLITICAL PAPERS OF CARL SCHURZ 279,316 (Frederic Bancroft ed .• 1913). 
7. See FONER, supra note 3. at 425-36; TRELEASE, supra note 4, at xxxiv. xlv-xlviii; Swinney, 
supra note 3, at 41, 48. 
8. See CONGo GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 437-38 (1871) (statement of Rep. Cobb); FONER, supra 
note 3. at 119.427.429-30; NIEMAN, supra note 4. at 124; TRELEASE, supra note 4. at 29, 101,202-03. 
229, 325. 331, 336-37, 341, 364-65. 
9. See FONER, supra note 3. at 426-31; DAVID M. OSHINSKY, "WORSE THAN SLAVERY": 
PARCHMAN FARM AND THE ORDEAL OF JIM CROW JUSTICE 24-28, 100 (1996); RABLE, supra note 4, nt 
28-30.98; TRELEASE. supra note 4. at xx-xxii. xliii, 28, 95-96, 101-08, 117, 130, 137, 139. 153, 167. 
176-78, 192-95, 197,202, 205, 227, 229-30, 232, 235, 251-52, 257, 262-63, 265, 271, 276, 278, 287-88, 
302-03,306,316,319-24, 329.331, 341.357-59.365,367-68,371-72; Swinney. supra note 3, at 48, 
208-09, 216-17, 250. 
10. "[W]hipping was the most common fonn of violence" used by the Ku Klux Klan in resisting 
Reconstruction. ROBERT J. KACZOROWSKI, THE POU11CS OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION: THE FEDERAL 
COURTS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND CIVIL RIGHTS, 1866-1876, at 53-54 (1985). "[Olver the course 
of two and one-half centuries corporal punishment became an accepted mode of dealing with incorrigible 
Negroes. Following the war it would be difficult to forswear the use of such a proven remedy for 
insolence and insubordination." Swinney. supra note 3, at 37. "Lynch mobs ordinarily executed their 
victims, while Ku K1uxers, although capable of murder as a last resort. preferred whipping .... " Id. 
at 47-48. In Tennessee, "[t]he normal punishment [of blacks by the Klan] was a whipping or beating 
administered on the bare back with 'hickories,' sticks or small branches torn off a nearby tree." 
TRELEASE, supra note 4, at 29. With respect to the Klan's conduct toward freedmen during Reconstruc-
tion, "the most common abuse was flogging." The Ku Klux Klan: A Secret History (History Channel 
television broadcast, Aug. 13. 1999). 
11. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 404, 427, 451 (\856) (ruling that the blacks 
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whites in the Reconstruction era continued to hold the same prejudice.12 What is 
surprising, though, is that white children, in addition to slaves and later freedmen, 
experienced similar abuse under the rod. During this period, it was common for 
white parents, in the name of discipline, to bring down the rod upon their own flesh 
and blood.13 Abolitionists had picked up on this strange parallel. "[M]any 
abolitionists, loathing all forms of physical bondage and abuse of the powerless, 
also fought to end corporal punishment"14 of children, black or white. The 
abolitionists' campaign against this scourge only partially succeeded. Given that the 
country was emerging from a Civil War fought, in large part, over slavery, and 
certainly not over child welfare issues, parental corporal punishment of children 
naturally was not on the Reconstruction Congress's reform agenda.'s 
After the war, Congress did, however, work to stem the tide of vigilante-style 
violence that oppressed blacks of all ages and their white allies in certain areas of 
the South. Among the series of laws enacted to remedy this violence and other 
injustices against blacks,'6 the Civil Rights Act of 1871,17 also popularly known 
as the Ku Klux Klan Act, is of central interest to this article. Section I of the 
statute marked the first appearance of the language which would, in all but a few 
particulars, become § 1983.'1 Because Congress, in adopting § 1983, did not 
whose ancestors were slaves are not "'people of the United States'" and that, under the Constitution. 
slaves are property like "an ordinary article of merchandise"); Alex M. Johnson. Jr .• Destabilizing Racial 
Classifications Based on Insights Gleanedfrom Trademark Law, 84 CAL. L. REV. 887, 952 n.85 (1996) 
(explaining that the origins of slavery can be traced back to the idea that blacks are subhuman); D. 
Marvin Jones. Darkness Made Visible: Law, Metaphor, and the Racial Self, 82 GED. L.J. 437.462 (1993) 
(stating that slavery made black identity synonymous with subhuman status). But see Frederick Douglass, 
"What to the Slave Is the Fourth of July?," in THE OXFORD FREDERICK DOUGl.ASS READER 108. 117 
(William L. Andrews ed .• 1996) (1852) (pointing out that Virginia laws making slaves criminally liable 
for certain conduct or forbidding anyone from teaching blacks to read were actually tacit ack-
nowledgments by whites that blacks are human beings). 
12. See 1'RELEASE, supra note 4. at 17 (noting that during Reconstruction Ku Klux Klan members 
"did not conceive of the Negro as a man"); James U. Blacksher. Majority Black Districts. Kiryas Joel. 
and Other Challenges to Al7Il!rican Nationaliml, 26CUMB. L. REV. 407, 421 (1995-1996) (indicating that 
during Reconstruction "the view persisted of blacks as subhuman beings"). 
13. See LERoy ASHBY. ENDANGERED CHiLDREN: DEPENDENCY, NEGLECf, AND ABUSE IN 
AMERICAN HISTORY 20 (1997); MYRA C. GLENN. CAMPAIGNS AGAINST CORPORAL PUNISHMENT: 
PRISONERS, SAILORS, WOMEN. AND CHILDREN IN ANTEBELLUM AMERICA 7-11, 30. 137. 145 (1984); 
MURRAY A. STRAUS. BEATING THE DEVIL OUT OF THEM: CORPORAL PuNISHMENT IN AMERICAN 
FAMIUES 19 (1994). But see Horace Bushnell, Christian Nurture, in CHILD-REARING CONCEPTS. 1628-
1861. at 138. 151. 176. 178 (Philip J. Greven cd., 1973) (recommending, during the two decades 
preceding the Civil War. that parents discipline their children without the use of corporal punishment). 
14. Stephen Nissenbaum. Lighting the Freedom Tree, N.Y. TIMES. Dec. 25, 1996. at A17; see also 
GLENN. supra note 13. at 39-40. 54. 57 (observing that critics of slavery also frequently criticized 
corporal punishment of children); STEPHEN NISSENBAUM. THE BATfLE FOR CHRISTMAS 186-87 (1997) 
(remarking that abolitionists had a general abhorrence of corporal punishment). But see STRAUS, supra 
note 13. at 19-20 (stating that early nineteenth-century efforts against corporal punishment of children 
were mostly directed at eliminating severe physical chastisement). 
15. See Gabor S. Boritt, Civil War, in 4 THE WORW BOOK ENCYCLOPEDIA 614, 614-15 (1993). 
16. See, e.g., Reconstruction Act of 1867, ch. 153. 14 Stat. 428; Civil Rights Act of 1866. ch. 31, 
14 Stat, 27; Freedman's Bureau Act of 1865, ch. 90. 13 Stat. 507. 
17. Ch.22. 17 Stat. 13. 
18. Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 provided as follows: 
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include legislative history to shed light on its meaning,19 the legislative history 
accompanying passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 has become key to 
understanding the proper role of § 1983.20 
While Congress aimed some provisions 'ofthe Civil Rights Act of 1871 directly 
at punishing and restraining the vigilantes themselves,21 section 1 focused on 
deterring the violence by holding state and local officials accountable for failing to 
stop the mayhem. Section 1 did this by creating a cause of action against any 
person who, under color of state laws, customs, or usages, deprived the plaintiff of 
certain federally guaranteed rights.22 Section 1 meant that southern authorities 
could face civil liability for using their official status to permit or abet Klan 
outrages resulting in a denial of federal rights.23 In a very real sense, then, section 
1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 was intended as an agent of peace as well as of 
social justice. 
Id. § 1. 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America 
in Congress assembled, That any person who, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, 
regulation, custom, or usage of any State, shall subject, or cause to be subjected, any 
person within the jurisdiction of the United States to the deprivation of any rights, 
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution of the United States, shall, any such 
law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of the State to the contrary not-
withstanding, be liable to the party injured in any action at law, suit in equity, or other 
proper proceeding for redress; such proceeding to be prosecuted in the several district or 
circuit courts of the United States, with and subject to the same rights of appeal, review 
upon error, and other remedies provided in like cases in such courts, under the provisions 
of the act of the ninth of April, eighteen hundred and sixty-six, entitled· An act to protect 
all persons in the United States in their civil rights, and to furnish the means of their 
vindication"; and the other remedial laws of the United States which are in their nature 
applicable in such cases. 
19. Research reveals no pertinent legislative history accompanying the codification of § 1983. 
20. See infra notes 37-67 and accompanying text 
21. See infra notes 42-47 and accompanying text 
22. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text. Section 1 originally provided a cause of action 
only for deprivation of federal constitutional rights. The section was amended to protect also against 
deprivation of federal statutory rights. REV. STAT. § 1979 (1878). 
23. See Ngiraingas v. Sanchez, 495 U.S. 182, 187·88 (1990); District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 
U.S. 418, 426 (1973); Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 239-42 (1972); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 
174-76 (1961), overruled in part on other groundfby Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 669, 
685-86, 690 (1978); David Y. Bannard, A Foreseeability-Based Standard for the Determination of 
Municipal Liability Under Section 1983, 28 B.C. L. REV. 937, 939-40 (1987); Douglas L. Colbert, 
Bifurcation of Civil Rights Defendants: Undermi1ling Monell in Police Brutality Cases, 44 HASTINGS L. 
J. 499, 515 (1993); Steven Stein Cushman, Municipal Liability Under § 1983: Toward a New Definition 
of Municipal Policymaker, 34 B.C. L. REV. 693, 694-95 (1993); Theodore Eisenberg, Section 1983: 
Doctrinal Foundations and an Empirical Study, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 482, 485 (1982); Gary S. Gildin, 
The Standard of Culpability in Section 1983 Bivens Actions: The Prima Facie Case, Qualified Immunity 
and the Constitution, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 557, 561 (1983); Susanah M. Mead, Evolution of the 'Species 
of Tort Liability' Created by 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Can Constitutional Tort Be Savedfrom Extinction?, 55 
FORDHAM L. REV. I, 15-17 (1986). But see Eric H. Zagrans, 'Under Color of What Law: A 
Reconstructed Model of Section 1983 Liability, 71 VA. L. REV. 499, 528, 532 (1985) (contending that 
the enactors of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 did not conceive of section 1 as a response to Klan 
violence). 
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In light of this history, it would be reasonable to expect that section I's modern 
incarnation, § 1983,14 would continue to be invoked in a way that discourages 
violent deprivation of federal rights. Section 1983, substantially tracking the 
language of section I, provides, in pertinent part: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, 
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, 
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or 
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any 
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, 
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or 
other proper proceeding for redress .... 25 
The differences in language between § 1983 and section I are, for purposes of this 
article, substantively insignificant;26 nor is there any legislative history indicating 
that the recodification of section 1 as § 1983 represented any important change in 
meaning.27 The obvious conclusion is that § 1983, as a continuation of section I, 
inherited the latter's mission as an agent of peace and social justice. Laws serving 
as agents of peace are, of course, highly desirable and even essential in our present 
violence-prone society where random mass murders in the nation's schoolsll and 
office buildings29 have become commonplace. It is therefore disturbing to discover 
that these days even § 1983 is being marshaled for violent purposes. Section 1983 
has become a sometime vehicle for litigants seeking elevation of interpersonal 
24. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). 
25. Id. 
26. See 1 JOSEPH G. COOK & JOHN L. SOBIESKI, JR., CIVIL RIGIITS AcnONS 1 1.27. at 1-332 n.47 
{1983} (noting that "tbe few differences between section I of the originnl Act and its cunent codification 
nrc inconsequential"). 
27. See supra note 19 and ;lccompanying text. 
28. See, e.g., Rick Brngg. Five Are Killed at School; Boys. 1 J and 13. Are Held, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
25, 1998, at AI; Rick Brngg, Forgiveness. After 3 Die in Kentucky Shooting. N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3,1997. 
at A16; James Brooke, 7Wo Student.r in Colorado School Said to Gun Down as Manya.t 23 and Kill 
Themrelves in a Siege, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 1999, at AI; Timothy Egan, Shoo/ings in a Schoolhou.re: 
The Town; Springfield Struggles to Heal Itself in Wake of SIUlotings. N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 1998, at 14; 
David Josar et nI., Tragedy Visits First Grade: Flint Six-Year-Old End.r School ScujJle by Fatally 
Shooting His CI(ISsmate, DETROIT NEWS, Mar. I, 2000, at AI; Kevin Sack. Grim Details Emerge in 
Teen-Age Slaying C(ISe. N.Y. TIMES, Oct. IS, 1997. at AIO; Shooting at High School in Virginia Leaves 
2 People Wounded, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 1998,-at AIS; if. James Stemgold. Three Small Boys Are Shot 
at a California Day Camp. N.Y. TIMES, Aug. II, 1999. at AI (reporting on a shooting by an adult at 
a day camp in a Jewish community center). 
29. See, e.g., Eric Bailey & Carl Ingrom, California and the West: Nevada City Su.rpect Fears 
Crowds, Neighbor Says; Shootings: Prosecutors Plan to Formally Charge Man Describ~d (IS Reclusive 
witll Three Counts of Murder, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2001, at A3; Carey Qoldberg, 7 Die in Rampage at 
Company: Co-worker of Victims Arrested. N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27. 2000, at AI; Kevin Sack. Gunman in 
Atlanta Slays 9, Then Himself, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 1999, at AI; Savagery in Oklahoma City, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 20, 1995. at A22; David Zeman et nl., Southfield SIuJOting Leaves 3 D~ad. 4 Hurt: Gunman 
Killed 2 People, Then Slwt Himselfin Office Tower. DETROIT FREE PRESS, June I~, 1999. at AI; if. Jim 
Yardley, Gunman Kills 7. and Himtelf, at Baptist Church in Fort Worth, N.Y. TIMES, Sepl. 16, 1999. 
at A 1 (reporting on a shooting in a church). 
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violence into a constitutional right.30 What is more, they have invoked § 1983 with 
respect to the very form of violence - hitting - to which the Klan so frequently 
resorted during Reconstruction?1 Described in the abstract, litigation furthering 
interpersonal violence seems iniquitous and incredible. Who would bring such a 
suit? It turns out that plaintiffs hardly hail from some mysterious unusually brutal 
sect; rather, they are a representative handful of the millions of American adults 
who corporally punish their children.32 
In a culture habituated to spanking its young, this answer may dispel the aura of 
iniquity. What is not dispelled, however, is the betrayal of § 1983's legacy and of 
the aspirations of all those who struggled against the badges of slavery, no matter 
who wore them. These parental plaintiffs' quest, if fulfilled, would make a perfect 
nightmare of the abolitionists' dreams. Corporal punishment of children persists to 
this day in the United States;33 and now, to add insult to injury, the Reconstruction 
legislation that helped to eradicate such punishment of blacks is being turned on its 
head in an attempt to transform physical chastisement of children into a federal 
30. See. e.g .• Sweaney v. Ada County, 119 F.3d 1385, 1387-91 (9th Cir. 1997) (parent filed § 1983 
suit arguing that officers violated her purported substantive due process and Fourth Amendment family 
privacy rights to corporolly punish her child); Backlund v. Barnhart, 778 F.2d 1386, 1389-90 (9th Cir. 
1985) (plaintiffs litigated § 1983 action claiming that a governmental attempt to limit their use of 
corporol punishment on their foster child violated the Free Exercise Clause of the Constitution); Balden 
v. Cottee, No. 4:98-cv-S4, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9524, at *24 (W.D. Mich. June 22, 1999), ajJ'd. No. 
99-1871,2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 14524 (6th Cir. June 19,2(00) (unpublished table decision) (plaintiffs 
predicated § 1983 action on, among other things, alleged violation of their Free Exercise Clause rights 
caused by state social worker's inve.~tigation of plaintiffs' practice of spanking their children and by the 
social worker's decision to seek prosecution of plaintiffs for child abuse); cf. Balden v. Cottee, No. 4-98-
cv-54, at 5, 19-20 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 11, 1999) (unpublished), ajJ'd, No. 99-1871, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 
14524 (6th Cir. June 19,2(00) (plaintiffs brought § 1983 action claiming a state employee violated their 
Free Exercise Clause rights by requiring plaintiffs to sign an agreement repUdiating corporal punishment 
as a disciplinary tool); Fowler v. Robinson, No. 94-cv-836. 1996 WL 67994, at *13 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 
1996) (in § 1983 action, plaintiffs contended. among other thinSS. that a county caseworker violated their 
free exercise of religion by advising plaintiffs not to use corporol punishment on their children and by 
requiring plaintiffs to sign an agreement that they would not use this form of punishment). 
31. See supra notes 3-\0 and accompanying text; infra notes 89-160 and accompanying text. 
32. See infra notes 33, 89-160 and accompanying text. 
33. According to a study done in 1995. in the United States, the percentage of parents using corporol 
punishment during the previous year was 35% for infants, 94% at ages three and four, over 50% at age 
twelve. 33% at age fourteen, and 13% at age seventeen. See Murray A. Straus & Julie H. Stewart, 
Corporal Punishment by American Parents: National Data on Prevalence. Chronicity. Severity. and 
Duration. in Relation to Child and Family Characteristics. 2 CUNICAL CHILD & FAMILY PSYCHOLOGY 
REV. 55. 59-60 (1999). However. a survey published in 1999 reveals that the use of corporol punishment 
is declining in the United States: 
[O]n1y 41 % of the parents in our most recent survey reported that they had spanked or 
hit their child in the last year, 17% fewer parents than reported this behavior in 1988. 
Another way of stating this decline is that almost one-third fewer parents are reporting the 
use of corporal punishment today than did so in 1988. 
DEBORAH DARO, PuBUC OPINION AND BEHAVIORS REGARDING CHILD ABUSE PREVENTION: 1999 
SURVEY (Nat'l Center on Child Abuse Prevention Research. Working Paper No. 840, Nov. 1999) 
available at http://www.preventchildabuse.orglresearch_ctr/reports.html. 
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constitutional right.34 The assertion of such a "parental right" is probably the only 
conceivable way of undennining § 1983's role as an agent of peace. It is hard to 
imagine § 1983 actions claiming a constitutional right to hit people in any other 
context. Thankfully, the federal courts have, thus far, roundly rebuffed plaintiffs and 
have refused to recognize the existence of a parental right to corporally punish 
children under the U.S. Constitution.35 
The reasons for the unanimous rebuff have had nothing to do with § 1983 and 
everything to do with the nonexistence of the asserted constitutional right. Courts 
cannot, of course, use § 1983 as a measure by which to detennine whether to 
extend or deny recognition to implied constitutional rights. But while § 1983 cannot 
be the ratio decidendi for the outcome in these cases, perhaps courts should at least 
be conscious that a win for plaintiffs would be a threat to § 1983's irenic aspect. 
Why, after all, would we want judges kept in the dark that recognition of a federal 
right to spank may mean gutting § 1983 and other constitutional values as well as 
putting society at large in some peril? A little knowledge is not always such a 
dangerous thing. 
This article identifies the unfolding historical irony implicit in these cases because 
it is interesting in itself and is a phenomenon about which the academy should be 
cognizant. It is painful, at least to this author, to observe § 1983 being enlisted for 
an end at such cross-purposes with the statute's noble origins. Hence, this article 
highlights the improbable but real linkage that has developed between judicial 
repudiation of corporal punishment of children as a constitutional right and 
preservation of § 1983's essential meaning as an agent of peace in our society. The 
article's other mission is more subtextual but no less important: it aims to highlight 
that corporal punishment once served as a badge of slavery and racism; as such, 
perhaps parents, and especially parents of color, should think twice before visiting 
this form of punishment on their children.36 For when the rod is wielded on 
children's bodies, intimations that they are mere property and unworthy of esteem 
also may steal into children's hearts and minds. 
This article is divided into three parts that elaborate and develop these themes. 
Part I reviews the historical context within which section 1, § 1983's predecessor 
statute, was passed, and the congressional intent undergirding the statute. Part II 
surveys § 1983 cases brought by parents alleging that they have a federal 
constitutional right to corporally punish their children. In so doing, Part II examines 
how judicial refusal to constitutionalize corporal punishment of children has become 
integral to § 1983's continuation as an agent of peace. Part m discusses the broader 
34. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text; infra notes 89-160 and accompanying text 
35. See, e.g .• Sweaney. 119 F.3d at 1388-93; Backlund. 778 F. 2d at 1387-89; Balden. No. 4:98·cv-
54. 1999 U.S. Dist LEXIS 9524. at *25-*26 (W.O. Mich. June 22. 1999) and No. 4:98-cv-54 (W.O. 
Mich. Feb. 11. 1999) (unpublished), affd. No. 99-1871.2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 14524. at *3-*4 (6th Cir. 
June 19. 2000) (unpublished table decision). 
36. For sociological critiques of African-American parents' propensity to use corporal punishment 
on their children, see CARL HUSEMOLLER NIGHTINGALE, ON THE EDGE: A HISTORY OF POOR BLACK 
CHILDREN AND THEIR AMERICAN DREAMS 98. 101, 103. 104-05. 190 (1993). and STRAUS. supra note 
13. at 116-17. 
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values at stake in maintaining § 1983's pacific role, including preserving 
constitutional values, reducing violent crime, furthering our regard for children, and 
retaining our collective memory of this country's struggles against barbarism and 
racism. 
I. History and Legislative Intent Behind § 1983 
The codification of § 1983, being purely ministerial in nature, has no accom-
panying elaboration in the congressional record to clarify the statute's meaning.37 
That circumstance does not necessitate, though, that our understanding of § 1983 
must be derived from a purely textual analysis. Section 1983 did not suddenly 
spring forth, Minerva-like, out of modem legislators' heads. To the contrary, § 1983 
had a gestation that began over a century ago. Section 1983, with a few 
amendments not relevant here,38 embodies and continues intact section 1 of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1871. As legislative history aplenty exists to illuminate the 
purposes of section .1,39 this genealogy offers rich opportunities for insight into the 
37. See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text. Section I of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 
appears to have been codified as § 1983 in 1952. Telephone Interview by Sharon Swietek-Madden with 
Jerald J. Director. Deputy Law Revision Counsel, Office of Law Revision Counsel (July 17.2(00). 
38. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text. The language of the current § 1983 differs in 
only a few meaningful particulars from the original language of section I of the Civil Rights Act of 
1871. In 1874. section I was amended to add the words "and laws" after the word "Constitution," 
thereby signifying that the amended statute created a cause of action for violations of federal stlltutes a.~ 
well as of the U.S. Constitution. REV. STAT. § 1979 (1878); Set aU(I Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. I. 
4,7 (1980) (holding that as a result of the 1874 amendment. § 1983 suits may be based solely upon 
violations of federal stlltute). In 1979. § 1983 was amended so that persons acting under authority of the 
laws or customs of the District of Columbia were made subject to suit. See Act of Dec. 29. 1979. Pub. 
L. No. 96-170. 93 Stat. 1284 (1979). And. in 1996. § 1983 was amended to preclude injunctive relief 
"against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity ... unless a 
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable." Federal Courts Improvement Act 
of 1996, Pub. L. 103-317. § 309(c), 110 Stat. 3853. 
It is an interesting oddity that while these amendments undoubtedly constitute positive law. courts 
consider § 1983 merely prima facie evidence of the law because title 42, which contains § 1983, has 
never actually been enacted. I U.S.C. § 204 (Supp. IV 1998) (listing those United States Code titles that 
have been enacted into positive law and omitting from that list 42 U.S.C. § 1983); see als(l Michael J. 
Lynch, The U.S. Code. the Statutes at Large, and Some Peculiarities (If Codification, 16 LEGAL 
REFERENCE SERVICES Q. 69, 73 (1997). Thus. as a technical matter. the legal evidence of the contents 
of § 1983 is actually section I of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 and subsequent amendments. Lynch, 
supra, at 70; JOE MOREHEAD, INTRODUCTION TO UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT INFORMATION SOURCES 
139 (6th ed. 1999) (explaining that approximately one-half of the titles of the United States Code have 
been enacted and are considered legal evidence of the law while the remaining titles are relegated to the 
status of prima facie evidence of the law). 
39. See infra notes 57-63 and al=companying text. Actually, the legislature modeled section I of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1871 after somewhat similar phraseology in an even earlier statute, section 2 of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1866. See 4 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 19.14, at 56 (3d ed. 1999). Section 2 provided: 
That any person who, under color of any law. statute, ordinance. regulation, or custom, 
shall subject, or cause to be subjected, any inhabitant of any State or Territory to the 
deprivation of any right secured or protected by this act, or to different punishment. pains, 
or penalties on account of such person having at any time been held in a condition of 
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legislative intent ultimately giving rise to § 1983.«1 
The raison d'etre for the Civil Rights Act of 1871 was to put a stop to the 
violence perpetrated after the Civil War by the Ku Klux Klan and other like-minded 
groups against blacks and against wh,ites identified with the federal government. 41 
The Act contained several provisions empowering the federal government to go 
after the Klan in immediate and sometimes dramatic ways. Section 2 authorized 
federal prosecution of persons engaged in conspiracies to thwart or overthrow the 
national government or who "shall conspire together, or go in disguise upon the 
public highway or upon the premises of another for the purpose ... of depriving 
any person ... of the equal protection of the laws."42 Section 2 additionally 
created a cause of action for damages in federal court against Klan-type conspirators 
who deprived others of their rights as United States citizens.43 Section 3 gave the 
President the right and the duty to use military force for the suppression of domestic 
violence or conspiracies depriving persons of their constitutional rights.'" Section 
4 also made it legal for the President to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas 
corpus in any situation where conspiracy should rise to the level of rebelIion.4s 
Section 5 barred such conspirators from sitting as jurors in any proceeding under 
slavery or involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall 
have been duly convicted, or by reason of his color or race, than is prescribed for the 
punishment of white persons, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on 
conviction, shall be punished by fine not exceeding one thousand dollars, or imprisonment 
not exceeding one year, or both, in the discretion of the court. 
Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 2, 14 Stat. 27; see infra note 61 for a discussion of the relevancy of 
section 2 to interpreting § 1983. 
40. There has been some controversy over the legitimacy of using legislative intent to interpret 
statutes. Compare T. Alexander A1einikoff, Updating StatutcJry Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 20, 21-
22, 27-30,46, 56-61 (1988) (favoring a "nautical" model of statutory construction whereby statutes are 
informed by contemporary norms), and William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 
U. PA. L. REV. 1479, 1481-82, 1538-39 (1987) (arguing that statutes should be interpreted dynamically 
in light of evolutive context), with Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting 
Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845 passim (1991) (emphasizing the usefulness of legislative intent and 
highlighting the likely harm if legislative intent were abandoned), and M.B.W. Sinclair, Statutory 
Reasoning, 46 DRAKE L. REV. 299, 299-303, 381-82 (1997) (pointing out that despite attacks upon it, 
"legislative intent has provided the guiding light for judicial decisions under statutes" and should remain 
so). The dominant view is that legislative intent is a valid tool of statutory construction. See 2A 
NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 45.05, at 22 (5th ed. 1992) 
(maintaining that legislative intent is the criterion most often recited in interpreting statutes); Earl M. 
Maltz, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Power: The Case for a Modified Intenlionalist Approach, 
63 TUL. L. REV. 1,2-3 (1988) (remarking that the U.S. Supreme Court regards legislative intent as "the 
touchstone of statutory interpretation"). In any event, legislative intent is generally accepted as an 
important and sometimes decisive source for understanding the parameters of § 1983. See infra notes 
61-70 and accompanying text. But see Jack M. Beermann, A Critical Approach to Section 1983 with 
Special Attention to Sources of lAw, 42 STAN. L. REV. 51,56-57 (1989) (surveying various critiques of 
legislative intent as a tool in interpreting § 1983). 
41. See infra note 50 and accompanying text. 
42. Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 2, 17 Stat. 13, 13. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. § 3, 17 Stat. at 14. 
45. Id. § 4, 17 Stat. at 14. 
HeinOnline -- 54 Okla. L. Rev. 342 2001
342 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:333 
the 1871 Act and imposed an oath upon these jurors that they had not aided such 
conspiracies.46 Finally, section 6 allowed for damages actions against anyone who 
had knowledge that the wrongs proscribed under section 2 were planned and who 
did not prevent, or try to prevent, the wrongs when it was in his or her power to do 
SO.47 
Section I, of a somewhat different stripe than the foregoing provisions, did not 
attempt to punish or restrain the marauders themselves. Rather, section I was 
directed at state employees and officials who, through complicity or fear, used their 
authority in ways that permitted or abetted the night riders' illegal activities. Section 
1 accomplished this end by creating a cause of action such that any person within 
the United States could bring suit against any other person who, under color of the 
law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of the state deprived the 
plaintiff of his or her federal constitutional rights.4I (Congress subsequently 
amended this section to protect against deprivation of federal statutory rights as 
well.t9 
The 1871 congressional record leaves no doubt that lawmakers intended the 
forthcoming legislation as a check on vigilante violence. Certainly, legislators fully 
appreciated that they had been called upon and were expected to tackle terrorization 
in the South. For example, a Senate committee issued a majority report on March 
10, 1871, studying then current social conditions in the South, and especially in 
North Carolina.5O The report chronicled a pervasive pattern of "intimidation, 
whipping and murder" by the Ku Klux Klan and similar organizations.sl The 
committee's "detailed findings did much ... to confirm and amplify Congressional 
understanding of the Ku Klux conspiracy."52 The record of the debates in the forty-
second Congress is replete with legislators' references to the overwhelming evidence 
of Klan atrocities,s3 including countless descriptions of Klansmen's special penchant 
46. Id. § 5, 17 Stat. at 15. 
47. Id. § 6, 17 Stat. at 15. 
48. Id. § I, 17 Stat. at 13. 
49. See supra note 22. 
50. S. REP. No. 42-1 (1871). 
51. TRELEASE, supra note 4, at 387; see also, e.g., S. REP. No. 42-1, at XVIII-XXXII, XXXIX-
XLIV, LV, LVIII, LXII-LXVII, LXIX, LXXII, LXXXII, XC-XCIV, XCVII, CI, 1,3,6,78·80,85-86, 
241-43,248,408,415-16,418-20,422 (1871). 
52. TRELEASE, supra note 4, at 387. 
53. See, e.g., CONGo GLOBE, 42d Con g., 1st Sess. 437-38 (1871) (setting forth the comments of Rep. 
Cobb concerning whippings, shootings, and drownings perpetrated against blacks and their white 
sympathizers in North Carolina); CONGo GLOBE 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 196 (1871) (reporting the 
observations of Rep. Snyder that vigilante groups existed in the South with the aim of overthrowing 
Reconstruction by "threats, intimidations, whipping, scourging, hanging, shooting, and murdering"); 
CONGo GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 276 (1871) (recording Rep. Porter's reference to the 423 pages 
of testimony given before a Senate committee on the "whipping, scourging, lacerating, maiming, hanging, 
drowning, and murdering" of freedmen and other victims of the Ku Klux Klan); CONGo GLOBE, 42d 
Cong., 1st Sess. app. 312 (1871) (reflecting Rep. Burchard's remarks that secret organizations in the 
South had bruised and maimed their victims for life and caused the victims to flee in terror); CONGo 
GLOBE, 42d Congo 1st Sess. app. 181 (1871) (documenting Rep. Mercur's enumeration of vigilante 
whippings, shootings, and drownings of blacks and whites in three North Carolina counties); CONGo 
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for "persuad[ ][ing] men by the lash."S4 As Senator Boreman summarized, the 
evidence before Congress showed that the Ku Klux Klan "murdered many 
inoffensive people; ... stripped naked and scourged large numbers of men and 
women; . . . [and has] been guilty of barbarities unparalleled in the history of 
civilized nations."55 Lest any legislator doubted the gravity of the threat to peace, 
President Grant sent a message entreating Congress to pass a law that would 
empower the federal government to "secure life, liberty and property,,56 against the 
continuing depredations. 
The congressional debates of April 1871 make clear that the bilI's proponents not 
only thoroughly understood the unrest to which they were responding, but also 
viewed the bill as imperative to ending the violence.57 As might be expected, 
GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 224 (1871) (setting forth Sen. Boreman's references to evidence 
establishing that the Ku Klux Klan murdered and scourged inoffensive people and was "guilty of 
barbarities unparalleled in the history of civilized nations"); CONGo GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 
190-94 (1871) (reporting Rep. Buckley's description of "Kukluxism" as resulting in "the foulest crimes 
which have disfigured the dark annals of human wickedness, and at whose recital the civilized world 
stands aghast"); CONGo GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 518 (1871) (containing Rep. Shellabarger's 
disquisition on the hundreds of thousands who were "scourged, mangled, banished and murdered" by a 
"systematized code" of violence); CONGo GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 166-67 (1871) (recording Rep. 
Williams' assertion that the Ku Klux Klan had as its object and ritual the intimidation, whipping, and 
murder of blacks and Republicans); CONGo GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 286-90, 293-97 (1871) 
(setting forth Rep. Stevenson's speech on the Ku Klux Klan's Whippings and other violence); CONGo 
GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 820 (1871) (reporting Sen. Sherman's description of Klan terrorization); 
CONGo GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 270-71 (1871) (recording Rep. Haven's references to the 
whippings, murder, and other outrages committed by the Klan); CONGo GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 
281-82 (1871) (containing Rep. Packard's speech concerning the murder of blacks and other Republicans 
by vigilante bands); CONGo GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 256 (1871) (memorializing Sen. Wilson's 
remarks concerning the Klan's "intimidation, ... mobbings, .•. burnings, scourgings and murdering"). 
54. CONGo GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 253 (1871) (comment of Sen. Morton); see also, e.g., 
CONGo GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 436-38 (1871) (comments of Rep. Cobb); CONGo GLOBE, 42d Cong., 
1st Sess. app. 273, 275-77 (1871) (comments of Rep. Porter): CONGo GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 
181 (1871) (comments of Rep. Mercur); CONGo GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 225-26 (1871) 
(comments of Sen. Boreman); CONGo GLOBE, 42d Con g., 1st Sess. 487 (1871) (comment~ of Rep. Tyner); 
CONGo GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. -app. 270 (1871) (comments of Rep. Havens); CONGo GLOBE, 42d 
Cong., 1st Sess. app. 287-90, 292-95 (1871) (comments of Rep. Stevenson); CONGo GLOBE, 42d Cong., 
1st Sess. app. 192-94 (1871) (comments of Rep. Buckley); CONGo GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 166-
67 (comments of Rep. Williams); CONGo GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 442 (1871) (comments of Rep. 
Butler). 
55. CONGo GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 224 (1871). 
56. CONGo GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 236 (187]). According to one commentator, President Grant 
had to be cajoled by radical Republican congressmen into sending the message to Congress requesting 
legislation for dealing with the Ku Klux Klan. David Achtenberg, A "Milder Measure of Villany": The 
Unknown History of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Meaning of "Under Color of'Law, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 
1,3,35-46. 
57. Su CONGo GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 68 (1871) (setting forth Rep. Shellabarger's 
comments that all sections of the bill including section I in particular "are wholly devoted to securing 
the .•. safety of all the people"); CONGo GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 277 (1871) (containing Rep. 
Porter's remarks that the House of Representatives was considering "legislation for protection of the loyal 
citizens of the South, from whipping, scourging, murder, and every conceivable outrage"); CONGo GLOBE, 
42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 316 (1871) (describing Rep. Burchard's statement that "enforcement of the 
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different legislators were preoccupied with different provisions of the bill during the 
debates. Naturally, some legislators gave particular attention to measures such as 
section 3, empowering the President to use force, andlor section 4, empowering the 
President to suspend the writ of habeas corpus - drastic measures more im-
mediately targeted at halting Klan crimes.S8 However, many legislators also 
referred to the bill in its entirety as offering the desired ameliorative effecf9 and 
at least five congressmen singled out section 1 in particular as advancing that end.w 
The logical inference is that these congressmen must have contemplated that section 
1 would, in its way, albeit a more indirect one, also contribute to deterring the 
provisions of this bill ... will aid in the restoration of order, ..• trnnquillize [sic] the disturbed portions 
of the Republic, and ren1ize the prayer of the President and responsive wish of the American people, 'Let 
us have peace.'"); CONGo GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 78 (1871) (documenting Rep. Perry's 
averment that "the provisions of this bill are predicated •.. [on] lawless bands of miscreants, wreaking 
violence upon defenseless persons"); CONGo GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 190 (1871) (chronicling 
Rep. Buckley's assertion that the pending bill was designed to protect the property, liberties, and lives 
of all races and classes); cf., CONGo GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 440 (1871) (recording Rep. Cobb's plea, 
"Sir, pass some bill, the bill [H.R.320] of the gentleman from Ohio [Rep. Shellabarger], or some bill like 
it ..• insuring protection to the peaceable and loyally-disposed citizens of the South, protection in their 
property, their liberty, and their lives; assure them of their safety at night without fear of Ku Klux 
assassination. H). 
58. See, e.g., CONGo GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 449 (1871) (setting forth the remarks of Rep. 
Butler in relation to section 3); CONGo GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 199,202 (1871) (relating the 
comments of Rep. Snyder concerning sections 3 and 4); CONGo GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 80 
(1871) (documenting Rep. Perry's speech focusing on sections 3 and 4). 
59. See, e.g., CONGo GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 68-69 (1871) (containing Rep. Shellabarger's 
statements to the effect that "the entire bill" and "the whole bill" would help combat the violence); CONGo 
GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 277 (1871) (documenting Rep. Porter's references to the proposed 
"legislation" as necessary to controlling the violence); CONGo GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 196 
(1871) (setting forth Rep. Snyder's assertions that "this measure" was essential to remedying the Klan's 
"evils"); CONGo GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 316 (1871) (recording Rep. Buchard's claim that "the 
provisions of this bill" would aid in restoring order and tranquility); CONGo GLOBE, 42d Congo 1st Sess. 
app. 78 (1871) (memorializing the comments of Rep. Perry that "the provisions of this bill" were 
intended to respond to the violence); CONGo GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 190 (1871) (containing 
Rep. Buckley's assertion that "the pending bill" was drafted to protect property and lives); CONGo GLOBE, 
42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 228 (1871) (documenting Sen. Boreman's understanding that "[t]his bill has 
been introduced" to remedy the "great wrongs," including acts of violence, perpetrated upon "the loyal 
people of the southern States"); CONGo GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 180 (1871) (recording Rep. 
Mercur's description of the object of "the bill now pending" as "the suppression of the outrages which 
exist in the South"). 
60. Rep. Shellabarger observed that section I was "wholly devoted to securing the equality and 
safety of all the people" and to "protection of the citizens of the United States." CONGo GLOBE, 42d 
Cong., 1st Sess. app. 68 (1871). Rep. Buchard refem:d to the entire bill, and specificalIy included section 
I, as a measure "for the suppression of this violence." CONGo GLOBE, 42d Cong. app. 313 (1871). Rep. 
Stevenson hailed as a means for securing peace the bill's extension of the federal courts' jurisdiction. 
CONGo GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 299 (1871). Rep. Blair disparagingly characterized section 1 
as designed to remedy assaults and batteries. CONGo GLOBE, 42d Con g., 1st Sess., app. 209 (1871). Sen. 
Sherman, in critiquing section I as ineffective, tacitly acknowledged that it was intended as a remedy 
for Ku Klux Klan violence. CONGo GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 820 (1871). It is, however, not entirely 
clear whether Sen. Sherman was referring to section I or to civil remedies also available under section 
2 of the bill. 
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turmoil. Section 1 did not empower militias to march or force perpetrators to 
languish in jail for want of a writ of habeas corpus, but it did put pressure on state 
officials to ensure that states did not enact laws or use state authority in aid of Klan 
outrages violative of federal rights.61 Section 1 made it more problematic for state 
61. See supra notes 18-23 nndaccompnnyingtext. In Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172-82 (1961), 
overruled in part on other grounds by Monnell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), the Court 
interpreted the "under color of" state law language of section I as making state officers subject to suit 
under that section even when the officers act contrary to or without authorization of state law. A few 
commentators, nnd most prominently Professor Eric Zagrans, have criticized this interpretation, 
concluding that section 1 was not intended to reach nonenforcement or violation of valid state laws. See, 
e.g., Zagrans, supra note 23, at 501-02, 525-35, 540-60; Jay I. Sabin, CLIO and the Court Redux: 
Toward a Dynamic Mode of Interpreting Reconstruction Era Civil Rights Laws, 23 COLUM. J. L. & Soc. 
PROBS. 369, 380-82, 399 (1990). But see Beermnnn, supra note 40, at 55-57 (asserting that legislative 
history surrounding section l's "under color of" state law clause is conflicting and that Professor Zagrans 
ignored legislative history contrary to his interpretation of the clause); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Federalism, 
State Courts, and Section 1983, 73 VA. L. REV. 959, 988 n.165 (1987) (opining that "nny interpretation 
of the Ku Klux Act that leaves the actions of the Ku Klux Klan unregulated - as Zagrans' would -
should be rejected out of hand"); Steven L. Winter, The Meaning of "Under Color of' Law, 91 MICH. 
L. REV. 323, 324-25, 378, 387-88 (1992) (characterizing Professor Zagrans' interpretation of § 1983's 
reference to "under color of" state law as "wrong" and "wildly ahistorical"). 
At first blush Professor Zagrans' critique, if sound, might seem detrimental to this article's conclusion 
that section I was nn nnti-violence measure. It is true that if section I were read only to make official 
action pursuant to unconstitutional state laws vulnerable to suit, the statute would have been less effective 
against the Ku Klux Klan's violence than if the statute were given the reading adopted in Monroe. But 
the truth of the foregoing observation also highlights the ultimate irrelevancy of Zagrans' critique to this 
article; even assuming arguendo that Zagrans' critique was correct, section 1 could still have had nnd 
been intended to have had some effect in restraining the KInn's rampages by preventing illegal state laws 
from being used to aid the Klnn. But see Zagrans, supra note 23, at 549 (drawing the inference from his 
critique that section 1 could not logically have been intended as a counterweight to the Klnn rebellion). 
The thesis of this article is that since section I was directed against violence, § 1983 should not be 
invoked to promote interpersonal violence. As a matter of logic, this thesis is supported whether section 
I was enacted to produce only some rather than a great deterrent against KIan violence. 
Nor is Professor Zagrans' critique successfully buttressed by his argument that the legislative intent 
giving rise to section 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 is determinative of the congressional intent with 
which section I of the 1871 Act was drafted. See Zagrans, supra note 23, at 540-59. It is well accepted 
that Congress adopted the 1866 statute to.counteract the Black Codes, laws passed by the southern states 
for the purpose of placing severe restrictions on the activities of blacks in the years immediately 
following the Civil War. See COOK & SOBIESKI, supra note 26, '11.19, at 1-174 to 1-177; NIEMAN, 
supra note 4, at 109-10; JACOBUS TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAw 177-81 (1965); Bennett, supra note 
3, at 457; cJ. PATRICK W. RIDDLEBERGER, 1866: THE CRmCAL YEAR REVISITED 87-88 (1979) 
(recounting Sen. Trumbull's defense of the proposed 1866 Act as responding to the near slavery caused 
by the Black Codes). It is also well accepted that section I of the 1871 Act was,modeled after section 
2 of the 1866 Act. See supra notes 18-29 nnd accompnnying text; CONGo GLOBE, 42 Cong., 1st Sess. 
app. 68 (1871). From these premises, Professor Zagrans has reasoned that the former statute, like the 
latter, must not have been meant to suppress violence. Zagrans, supra note 23, at 540-59. This inference 
is unsupportable as a matter of logic nnd, perhaps, history. Logic does not support Professor Zagrans' 
inference because it is entirely possible that the language of section I could be similar to the language 
of section 2, nnd, yet, Congress could have had quite different purposes in enacting each statute to meet, 
in each case, unique historical situations. That is, why should Congress not seek to make persons acting 
"under color of" state law accountable for the discriminatory Black Codes in 1866 nnd then again 
accountable for complicity with or tolerance of Ku Klux Klan violence in 1871? Professor Zagrans' 
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,representatives to engage in what the congressional record shows to be their 
postbellum modus operandi of turning a blind eye to or even participating in Klan 
vendettas.62 Section 1 was, in short, part of a package crafted to meet and suppress 
the paramilitary onslaught in multifaceted ways. That is no doubt why the 
legislation was dubbed the Ku Klux Klan Act and why Representative Lowe stated 
inference also may not withstand close historical analysis since there is evidence that the Black Codes 
instituted state-sanctioned violence such as whipping and capital punishment of blacks who violated 
certain code restrictions. See THE POLmCAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DURING THE 
PERIOD OF RECONSTRUCTION (FROM APRIL 15, 1865, TO JULY 15, 1870) 29, 33, 35, 38-40 (Edward 
McPherson ed., Negro Universities Press 1969) (1875) (setting forth code provisions allowing physical 
punishments in North Carolina, Georgia, South Carolina, and Florida.); set! also Schurz, supra note 6, 
at 387 (lamenting that U[h]ere is South Carolina ... with a black code, reestablishing even the names 
of ' master' and 'servant: only transferring the Whipping business from the master to the town magistrate); 
Bennett, supra note 3, at 457 (explaining that the 1866 Act allowed blacks "to conduct themselves in 
ways designed to preserve their safety"); Colbert, supra note 23, at 511-12, 514-15, 517 (asserting that 
the 1866 Act was intended to counter white violence). Implementation of such violence under the Black 
Codes arguably contravened the guarantee of "security of person" in section I of the 1866 Act - a 
guarantee made enforceable by section 2 of the Act. See CONGo GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1118 
(1866) (reflecting Rep. Wilson's interpretation that the Act was needed to protect personal security, i.e., 
"'a person's ... uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his health'" (quoting from 
Blackstone»; CONGo GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866) (containing Sen. Trumbull's assertions that 
section I of the Act was designed to protect against such provisions as that enacted by Mississippi 
authorizing up to thirty-nine lashes on the bare back of a black functioning as a minister); cf. CONGo 
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1160 (1866) (recording Rep. Thayer's rationales for the 1866 Act that the 
Black Codes allowed freedmen to be "whipped for insolence," to be "whipped [and) •.. whipped again" 
for complaining about the pass system, and then recording his question, "Sir, do you at this late day call 
the Whipping-post and the pass system evidence of liberty?"). Implementation of such violence, if meted 
out only to blacks, could also be prosecuted under section 2's prohibition on governmentally imposed 
punishments that differed according to the race of the convict. See, e.g., NIEMAN, supra note 4, at 73, 
90,95 (observing that Freedmen's Bureau officials were incensed by southern criminal laws that allowed 
courts to give harsher criminal punishments to blacks than to whites and recounting such laws as 
permitted the lash for blacks but not for whites); THE POLmCAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA DURING TIlE PERIOD OF RECONSTRUCTION (FROM APRIL IS, 1865, TO JULY IS, 1870), supra, 
at 29 (setting forth a North Carolina law that made rape of a white woman by a black man, and not by 
a white man, a capital crime). But see THEODORE BRANTNER WILSON, THE BLACK CODES OF THE 
SoUnt 89 (1965) (contending that states resorted to corporal punishment "frequently without regard for 
race or color"). 
In any event, it bears emphasizing that Zagrans' critique does not have the force of law. Since the 
Monroe decision, it has been settled that the "under color of' state law phraseology of section I's 
successor, § 1983, makes state officers subject to suit under that section even if the officer acted without 
authorization or in contravention of state law. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 171-87; see also ERWIN 
CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDlcrJON 459-60 (3d ed. 1999); 4 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. 
NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 19.14, at 58 (3d ed. 1999). 
62. See, e.g., CONGo GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 374 (1871) (comments of Sen. Lowe); CONGo 
GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 487 (1871) (comments of Rep. Tyner); CONGo GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 
442 (1871) (comments of Rep. Butler); CONGo GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 285 (1871) (comments 
of Rep. Stevenson); CONGo GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 312 (1871) (comments of Rep. Burchard); 
CONGo GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 820 (1871) (comments of Sen. Sherman); CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 
1st Sess. app. 271 (1871) (comments of Rep. Havens); S. REP. No. 42-1, at XXXI, 2, 85-88, 241, 407, 
409, 420, 422 (1871). 
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that "this bill is a measure of peace, ,,63 without making distinctions as to its parts. 
Drawing upon the context in which the bill was passed, twentieth-century U.S. 
Supreme Court opinions,64 scholarly commentary,6S and portions of the congres-
sional record66 all manifest a contemporary consensus that section I was intended 
as an agent of peace. Moreover, this consensus has not been reached as mere 
academic odyssey. The discussions of section I have generally been for the very 
definite and practical purpose of illuminating the meaning of § 1983.67 It follows 
63. CONGo GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 376 (1871). 
64. See, e.g., Ngiraingas V. Sanchez, 495 U.S. 182, 187-88 (1990); Will V. Mich. Dep't of State 
Police, 491 U.S. 58, 84-85 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Jett V. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist, 491 U.S. 701, 
722-23 (1989); Wilson V. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276-77 (1985); Briscoe V. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 337-38 
(1983); District of Columbia V. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 425-27 (1973); Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 
238-41 (1972); Monroe, 365 U.S. at 174-80. 
65. See, e.g., Achtenberg, supra note 56, at 6-7; Alfred Avins, The Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871: Some 
Reflected Light on State Action and the Fourteenth Amendment, 1\ ST. loUIS U. LJ. 331, 331-32 
(1967); Colbert, supra note 23, at 505-06, 510, 513-17; Michael G. Collins, Implied Constitutional 
Actions, and the Scope of Section 1983,77 GEO. LJ. 1493, 1507 (1989); Gildin, supra note 23, at 560-
61; A. E. Dick Howard, State and Local Government Issues Before the Supreme Court, 31 CAlli. U. L. 
REV. 375,376-77 (1982); Mead, supra note 23, at 15-16; Xi Wang, The Making of Federal Enforcement 
Laws, 1870-1872,70 CHl.-KENT L. REV. 1013, 1048-50 (1995); Michael Wells, Federalism: Allocating 
Respon.fibility Between the Federal and State Courts: Why Professor Redish Is Wrong About Abstention. 
19 GA. L. REv. 1097, 1098, 1103-04 (1985); Michael B. Brennan, Note, Orure V. Owens: Choosing 
Anumg Personal Injury Statutes of Limitations for Section 1983, 82 Nw. U. L. REV. 1306, 1330-1334 
(1988); Paul Howard Morris, Note, The Impact of Constitutional Liability on the PrivaliZiltion Movement 
After Richardson V. McKnight, 52 V AND. L. REV. 489, 497-98 (1999); Daniel Steiner, Note, Due Process 
in Section 1983: Limiting Parratt V. Taylor to Negligent Conduct, 71 CAL. L. REV. 253, 258 (1983); see 
also Cushman, supra note 23, at 720, 723 (acknowledging that section 1 was intended to respond to Ku 
Klux. Klan violence, but also asserting that a primary purpose of the statute was to compel state officials 
to uphold laws uniformly); Eisenberg, supra note 23, at 484-85,509,519 (noting that enactment of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1871 was prompted by Ku Klux. Klan violence, but also contending that a central 
purpose of section I was to combat race discrimination); Kevin J. Hamilton, Section 1983 and the 
Independent Contractor, 74 GEO. LJ. 457, 460 (1985) (contending that section I was a "minor part" of 
an enactment drafted to curtail Ku Klux. Klan outrages). But see Zagrans, supra note 23, at 549 (claiming 
that section I "is actually an interloper in the Ku Klux. Klan Act" and not "an integral part of the solution 
to the Klan problem"). 
66. The legislative history accompanying more recent amendmenl~ and attempted amendments to 
§ 1983 demonstrate Congress's continued conception of section I as an agent of peace. In 1977, a bill 
was introduced which, had it not died in committee, would have provided, among other things, that 
states, municipalities, and subdivisions of these governments could be sued pursuant to § 1983. Civil 
Rights Improvements Act of 1971, S. 35, 95th Cong.; see alsCl Bill Summary & Status for the 95th 
Congress, at http://thomas.loc.govlbssld095query.html (last visited Aug. 7, 2001). In discussing the bill, 
Sen. Mathias noted that the amendment's primary purpose would be to insure "the continued vitality of 
'The Civil Rights Act of 1871,'" which had been expected to interpose the federal government as 
"guarantor against the violence that had plagued the early years of ... [blacks'] freedom." 123 CONGo 
REC. 554 (1977) (statement of Sen. Mathias); see also H.R. REP. No. 96-548, at I (1979), reprinted in 
3 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2609 (stating, in connection with a 1979 amendment to § 1983, that section I of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1871 served as a deterrent against the oppression of blacks and Republicans during 
the Reconstruction era). 
67. See, e.g., Ngiraingas, 495 U.S. at 187-88; Jett, 491 U.S. at 722-31; Wilmn, 471 U.S. at 276-79; 
Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 336-41; Carter, 409 U.S. at 425-29, 432; Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 238-42; Monroe, 
365 U.S. at 174-83; Achtenberg, supra note 56, passim; Colbert, supra note 23, at 505,509-10,513-18; 
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that if section 1 was an agent of peace, § 1983 now carries that mantle as well.6& 
That is why the Supreme Court has characterized § 1983 as creating a cause of 
action for personal injury, including injury induced by assault and other violence.(\'} 
"The atrocities that concerned Congress in 1871 plainly sounded in tort. Relying on 
this premise we have found tort analogies compelling in establishing the elements 
of a cause of action under § 1983 .... "70 In keeping with its pacific origins, § 
1983 has been routinely irivoked by modem plaintiffs seeking redress for officially 
perpetrated violence alleged to be violative of federal rights. It has recently been 
estimated that the largest number of § 1983 cases are claims that state and local law 
enforcement personnel have used excessive force.'· 
In light of the terrible suffering that led to § 1983's enactment and of the statute's 
past and present role as a guardian of peace, it would be sad indeed if society now 
failed to honor this history. One way of failing § 1983 would be to ignore it, and, 
as a matter of fact, § 1983 was virtually ignored for the first ninety years of its 
existence.72 Scholars have ascribed this sterility to various causes, the nature of 
which exceed the scope of the present article.73 Suffice it to say that those causes 
Collins, .~upra note 65, at 1506·07, 1552·53; Myrimn E. Gilles, Breaking the Code of Silence: 
Rediscovering "Cu.~tom" in Section 1983 Municipal liability, 80 B.U. L. REV. 17, 19·21,50-60 (2000); 
Mead, supra note 23, at 15·18; Nichol, supra note 61, at 971·78; Wells, supra note 65, at 1097·98, 
1104·07; Bill Summary & Status for the 95th Congress, supra note 66. 
68. Cf, Wilson, 471 U.S. at 276·77. 279·80 (holding that, for purposes of selecting an applicable 
statute of limitations, § 1983 chums are best conceptualized as persolllll injury actions); Bannard, supra 
note 23, at 978 (stating that suits such as those brought under § 1983 have reduced by half the number 
of citizens killed pursuant to government policies of major metropolitan areas); Beennann, supra note 
40, at 90 (describing the liberal perSpective on § 1983 as serving to restrain prison guards and officials 
from abusing prisoners in the same way that blacks were mistreated during Reconstruction); Colbert, 
supra note 23, at 525 (observing that § 1983's purpose is to create a federal civil rights remedy for 
"official lawlessness and organized, racially motivated violence"); Gilles, supra note 67, at 19·21,63·65, 
90·92 (arguing that § 1983 actions should be employed to reach the "custom" of the police code of 
silence that protects officers who violate civil rights through violence and other misconduct); Lee L. 
Cameron, Jr., Note, Civil Rights: Determining the Appropriate Statute of limitations for Section 1983 
Claims, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 440, 451 (1986) (noting that Congress's intent was for § 1983 "to 
promote peace, justice, and the security of life, liberty, and property through civil enforcement"). 
69. See Wilson, 471 U.S. at 276·77, 279·80. 
70. Ttl. at 277 (citation omitted). 
71. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 61, § 8.9, at 539 (reporting a recent estimation that the largest 
number of § 1983 cases consists of claims against law enforcement personnel for using excessive force); 
IA MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ, SECllON 1983 LmOATION: CLAIMS AND DEFENSES § 3.13, at 227 (3d ed. 
1997) (indicating that most § 1983 actions are brought against law enforcement personnel for using 
excessive force); Barbara E. Armacost, Race and Reputation: The Real Legacy of Paul v. Davis, 85 VA. 
L. REV. 569, 581 (1999) (referring to the fact that in recent times the biggest category of § 1983 cases 
has been Eighth Amendment claims by prisoners and excessive force complaints against law enforcement 
officials); John R. Williams, Trial and Past·Trial Issues: The Plaintiffs Perspective, 622 PLULit 201, 
207 (2000) (stating that the most ubiquitous fonn of § 1983 litigation involves unreasonable force by 
police officers and brutality by prison guards.) 
72. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 61, § 8.2, at 455·56; Collins, supra note 65, at 1498; Colbert. 
supra note 23, at 506, 518; Mead, supra note 23, at 19. 
73. For brief surveys of the reasons why the legal system disregarded § 1983 for nearly a century, 
see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 61. § 8.2, at 455 and Collins, supra note 65, at 1495 n.14, 1498·99. 
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ceased to be a factor and that federal judges have had their hands full with a 
superabundance of § 1983 cases ever since.7' 
There is, however, another, more blatant, way to undermine § 1983: plaintiffs 
could try to marshal the statute to actually promote interpersonal violence. Under 
the aegis of § 1983, plaintiffs could try to sue on the theory that state or local 
officials interfered with a purported federal right to engage in interpersonal violence. 
Such litigation would seem a strange and shameful denouement for an agent of 
peace; it would signal that instead of making steady progress toward a civilized and 
humane social order, a trend in which § 1983 has played a crucial part, society is 
regressing toward condoning and even exalting the raised hand. It should be, 
therefore, disturbing to learn that such litigation exists and that plaintiffs have relied 
upon § 1983 to assert the right to hit people75 - the right to use precisely the Ku 
Klux Klan's favorite mode of attacking blacks and white RepUblicans during 
Reconstruction. 
11. Section 1983 Cases Brought by Parents Alleging a Federal Constitutional 
Right to Corporally Punish Their Children 
Over the course of the past fifteen years, a small but nonetheless perturbing 
number of suits have appeared in which parents have invoked § 1983 to state a 
cause of action against governmental employees who interfered with the parents' 
power to hit their children.76 The parents have premised these suits upon the 
supposition that this type of governmental interference violates a purported parental 
federal constitutional right to administer corporal punishment upon minor 
offspring.77 Although the U.S. Supreme Court has never held that parents have 
such a right,71 plaintiffs have argued for variously locating it in the substantive due 
74. "Since 1961, •.• the growth in § 1983 litigation has been phenomenal. In 1977, there were over 
20,000 such suits; in 1985, the number grew to over 36,000; by 1995, the number had increased to over 
57,000." CHEMERINSKY, supra note 61, § 8.2. at 456. 
75. See infra notes 89-160 and accompanying text. 
76. See infra notes 89-160 and accompanying text. 
77. See infra notes 89-160 and accompanying text. 
78. Research reveals that the U.S. Supreme Court has never weighed in on whether there is a federal 
constitutional right, held by parents, to corporally punish their children. The Court has dealt with 
corporal punishment of children only in relation to the pmctice's constitutional permissibility in schools. 
In Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 653 (1977), the petitioners claimed, among other things, that 
paddling administered as discipline by school personnel upon two junior high school students amounted 
to the cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. See 
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. School officials gave Ingraham more than twenty licks with a paddle; his 
paddling was so severe that he suffered a hemotoma necessitating medical intervention and causing his 
absence from school for several days. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 657. School officials gave the petitioner, 
Andrews, a fellow student, several paddlings for minor infractions. On two occasions, Andrews was also 
hit on the arms, once so as to deprive him of the full use of his arm for a week. Id. at 657. Nevertheless, 
the Court held "the Eighth Amendment does not apply to the paddling of children as a means of main-
taining discipline in public schools." Id. at 664. The Court's rationale was that the Eighth Amendment's 
reach should be limited to criminal punishments in keeping with the original intent behind the 
amendment. See id. at 664-71. As a result, the Eighth Amendment does not forbid elementruy and 
secondary schools from meting out corporal punishment to students. 
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process right of parents to raise and educate their children,79 in a family privacy 
right,SO in the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment,BI and/or in the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.1!2 In most of these cases, the 
defendants have asserted qualified immunity as a defense;X3 in particular, defen-
dants have argued for such immunity on the ground that, at the time of the 
governmental interference in issue, there was no clearly established federal 
constitutional right lodged in parents to corporally punish their children." 
In making this argument, defendants have followed well-settled law on qualified 
immunity. For the U.S. Supreme Court has held that in deciding whether qualified 
immunity protects a government official, a court must first ascertain whether a 
"'plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of any actual constitutional right at all, and if 
so, then proceed to determine whether that right was clearly established at the time 
of the alleged violation"'8s such that a reasonable person would have known of the 
Ingraham, a 5-4 decision, may be ripe for ovenuling. Indeed, Ingraham appears positively 
incongruous when considered in juxtaposition to Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. I (1992). In McMillian, 
security guards beat a prison inmate while he was handcuffed and shackled. Id. at 4. The guards punched 
him in the mouth, eyes, chest, and stomach, and kicked him from behind. Id. Consequently, the victim 
suffered minor bruises and swelling, some loosened teeth, and a crack in his partial dental plate. Id. The 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit acknowledged the use of force as excessive but refused to 
rule for the prisoner because his injuries were "minor" and did not require medical attention. See id. at 
5. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the use of excessive force that inflicts only minor injuries 
on a prisoner may constitute an Eighth Amendment violation as long as the prisoner's injuries are more 
than de minimis. [d. at 9-10. 
Thus, under the present state of the law, a schoolchild paddled so severely as to require medical aid 
does not have a viable Eighth Amendment claim, while a prisoner hit by guards so as to cause minor 
injuries that do not require medical interference does have a viable Eighth Amendment claim. 
Incidentally, the plaintiffs in both Ingraham and McMillian brought their claims pursuant to § 1983. 
McMillian, 503 U.S. at 4; Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 653. Insofar as Ingraham leaves schoolchildren without 
an Eighth Amendment claim against corporal punishment administered by school personnel, the case 
would seem to be inconsistent with the history and intent behind § 1983. No party in Ingraham, 
however, sought recognition of a constitutional right to engage in interpersonal violence and the 
Ingraham Court did not rule that school personnel have any such right. See Sweaney v. Ada County, 
119 F.3d 1385, 1390 (9th Cir. 1997). Rather, the Supreme Court held that school personnel could hit 
children in the name of discipline without running afoul of the Eighth Amendment. Ingraham is thus 
still a far cry from those suits, described in the text above, brought in quest of an actual constitutional 
right to engage in interpersonal violence against children. See infra text accompanying notes 89-152. 
79. For a full discussion of parents' substantive due process right to mise and educate their children 
and that right's relation to parental corporal punishment of children, see Susan H. Bitensky, Spare the 
Rod, Embrace Our Humanity: Toward a New Legal Regime Prohibiting Corporal Punishment of 
Children, 31 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 353, 453-57, 464-73 (1998). 
80. For a thorough exegesis concerning a constitutional family privacy right and that right's relation 
to parental corporal punishment of children, see id. at 453-54, 461-73. 
81. For a full analysis of Free Exercise Clause law in relation to parental corporal punishment of 
children, see id. at 453-54, 457-61, 464-73. 
82. See infra notes 114-35 and accompanying text. 
83. See infra text accompanying notes 93-146. 
84. See infra text accompanying notes 93-146. 
85. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999) (quoting from Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 291 
(1999»; see also County of Sacmmento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n.5 (1998); Siegert v. Gilley, 500 
U.S. 226, 232-33 (1991). 
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right's existence.16 It is in the context of deciding the qualified immunity question 
that each court has had occasion to issue the interesting holding that there is no 
clearly established federal constitutional parental right to physically chastise 
children17 and, in two cases, no right of corporal punishment at all.xs These cases 
are, of course, noteworthy because they provide insight into contemporary federal 
courts' thinking about the existence of the alleged right. But, more to the point here, 
the cases warrant close attention because they reflect little-noticed and rather 
alarming attempts to convert § 1983 from its traditional role as an agent of peace 
into a vehicle of violence against children. 
The earliest in this series of cases is Backlund v. Bamhart.89 The suit was 
brought under § 1983 by foster parents asserting that officials of the Washington 
State Department of Social and Health Services interfered with plaintiffs' "right" to 
exercise their religious beliefs by spanking their foster child, eight-year-old 
Pamela.90 "The Backlunds explained that they followed 'Biblical mandate' requiring 
them to spank the girl with a paddle or stick."91 According to plaintiffs, state 
officials interfered with this religious mandate by directing the foster parents to stop 
using such punishment and by removing Pamela when plaintiffs refused to 
comply.92 The defendants' qualified immunity defense was that their official 
intervention against this treatment of the child violated no clearly established 
constitutional right to corporally punish children.93 
The Ninth Circuit upheld this defense on two grounds. First, the court reasoned 
that, even assuming arguendo that foster parents enjoy the same rights as natural 
parents, the latter do not possess a "clearly established right to unlimited exercise 
of religious beliefs on their children," including "religious beliefs about punish-
ment."94 Moreover, the Backlunds "failed to show a violation of any constitutional 
right, clearly established or not."9S Second, the court opined that, in any event, 
foster parents are not entitled to the same constitutional protections as natural 
parents vis-a-vis the children in their custody.96 
Although the Backlund court did not deal with the propriety of plaintiffs' use of 
§ 1983, the court's rebuff to plaintiffs' argument had the effect of preventing § 1983 
from being turned into a vehicle of violence, a vehicle for constitutionalizing 
corporal punishment of children. The Backlund decision, fortunately for children 
and § 1983's legacy, presaged the way in which other federal courts would 
86. See. e.g .• Wilson. 526 U.S. at 609; Conn. 526 U.S. at 290; United States v. Lanier. 520 U.S. 259. 
270 (1997). 
87. See infra text accompanying notes 94-152. 
88. See infra text accompanying notes 110-52. 
89. 778 F.2d 1386 (9th Cir. 1985). 
90. Id. at 1387-88. 
91. Id. at 1387. 
92. Id. at 1387. 
93. Id. at 1388-89. 
94. Id. at 1389. 
95. Id. at 1390 (emphasis added). 
96. Id. at 1389. 
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subsequently dispose of these types of cases.97 
Indeed, the Ninth Circuit had occasion to again deal with a Backlund-type case 
in Sweaney v. Ada County.98 In Sweaney, the government prosecuted Sherie 
Sweaney for striking her son Brian five to seven times with a belt, leading to a 
bruise on Brian's arm.w After a jury acquitted Sweaney of willfully causing her 
son to be injured under state law,loo she filed a § 1983 action in federal court 
against Ada County and the county's sheriff and deputy sheriff on the theory that 
these defendants had violated her parental right to corporally punish her son under 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.IDI The deputy sheriff 
responded by raising the defense of qualified immunity, i.e., that at the time of the 
deputy sheriffs investigation of Sweaney, parents had no clearly established federal 
constitutional right to corporally punish their children.lD2 
Plaintiff-appellant Sweaney's argument before the court of appeals turned on the 
notion that a parental right to spank children is implicit in a right to family privacy 
or integrity, which, in tum, is implicit in the Fourteenth Amendment.103 In support 
of this argument, Sweaney invoked U.S. Supreme Court precedents dealing with a 
variety of parental constitutional rights in relation to children.104 For example, she 
97. See infra text accompanying notes 98-152. 
98. 119 F.3d 1385 (9th Cir. 1997). 
99. Id. at 1387-88. 
100. It!. at 1388. 
IOI. It!. The appellate court opinion does not disclose whether Sweaney specified a particular clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment in making her claim. Sweaney also brought her § 1983 action on the basis 
that defendants had contravened her Fourth Amendment rights. Id. passim. However. the appellate court 
opinion does not refer to any precedents or argumentation that would support placing an implied parental 
right to corporally punish children in the Fourth Amendment. It!. passim. 
102. It!. at 1388-92. Defendants also argued that Sweaney incorrectly relied on the doctrine of 
respondeat superior to support her claims against the county and the sheriff. Id. at 1388. 
103. It!. at 1388-89. 
104. Sweaney referred the court to such U.S. Supreme Court precedents as Meyerv. Nebraska, 262 
U.S. 390, 399·4()3 (1923), establishing parents' substantive due process rights to raise and educate their 
children; Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 164 n.8, 165-66, 169-70 (1944), holding that a state 
child labor law, prohibiting children from disseminating religious literature on the streets, was a proper 
exercise of the State's authority to protect children and did not violate the Free ExercL~e Clause or, by 
implication, a substantive due process child rearing right; Stanley v. Illinois,405 U.S. 645, 649, 657-58 
(1972), ruling that procedural due process requires that an unwed father be accorded a hearing on his 
fitness as a parent before removing his children from him and ruling that the State denied an unwed 
father equal protection rights by denying him such a hearing while providing it to all other parents who 
faced losing custody of their children; Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1942), finding an 
equal protection violation exists with respect to a law providing for sterilization of persons convicted of 
grand larceny but not imposing such a punishment on persons convicted of embezzlement; May v. 
Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 528-29, 534-35 (1953), holding that an Ohio state court was not required to 
give full faith and credit to a Wisconsin divorce decree awarding custody of minor children to their father 
where the decree was obtained in an ex parte divorce action in a Wisconsin state court that did not have 
personal jurisdiction over the mother; Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 32-33 
(1981), ruling that failure to appoint counsel for an indigent parent in a proceeding for termination of 
parental status did not deprive the parent of due process under the particular circumstances of this case; 
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664, 670-71, 680, 682 (1977), finding that the Eighth Amendment's 
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments does not apply to corporal punishment of studenl~ in public 
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relied on Meyer v. Nebraska/os a case in which the U.S. Supreme Court struck 
down a statute prohibiting the teaching of subjects in foreign languages or the 
foreign languages themselves to students who had not yet passed the eighth 
grade.106 The Meyer Court had found that the statute ran afoul of substantive due 
process by interfering with students' freedom to acquire useful knowledge, the 
parents' right to direct the upbringing of their offspring, teachers' right to teach, and 
parents' and teachers' right to contract with each other for the latter's instructional 
services.107 In short, Meyer did not involve allegations of parental corporal 
punishment of children and the Court in that case certainly did not announce a 
constitutional right to physically chastise children.11II In actuality, neither Meyer 
nor any of the federal court cases cited by Sweaney as precedent involved such 
punishment or announced such a new right.109 
The court in Sweaney did concede that by "broadly" extending the ratio decidendi 
of these cases, a court conceivably could interpret them to hold that parents do have 
an implicit constitutional right to strike children.llo However, the Sweaney court 
concluded that the existence of such a possibility did not demonstrate that the right 
was clearly establishedlll at the time of the alleged violation or even that the right 
schools and that procedural due process does not require hearing and notice prior to the administration 
of such punishment in public schools. 
105. 262 U.S. 390 (l923). 
106. ld. at 396·97. 
107. ld. at 399-403. 
108. See id. passim. It is dubious whether Meyer upheld any parental rights at all. Parents were not 
litigants in Meyer. And the case really did not involve child rearing beyond parents' decisions to obtain 
private educational instruction for their child. These factors, taken in conjunction with the absence of 
analysis regarding a parental child·rearing right beyond a few conclusory sentences, leave some question 
as to whether the parents' interests in Meyer were necessarily integral to the holding in that case. 
Arguably, any references in Meyer to the parental prerogative of child rearing aI\l, strictly speaking, dicta. 
See, e.g., Bitensky. supra note 79, at 456; ArIdrew Jay Kleinfeld, The Balance of Power Among Infants, 
Their Parents and the State, 4 FAM. L.Q. 409, 418 (l970); Francis Barry McCarthy, The Confused 
Constitutional Status and Meaning of Parental Rights, 22 GA. L. REV. 975. 988-90, 992 (1988). 
Nevertheless, a common view espoused by the U.S. Supreme Court and commentators is that Meyer did 
posit in parents a general constitutional child-rearing right. See, e.g., M.L.B. v. S.LJ., 519 U.S. 102, 116-
17 (l996); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 445-47 {l990}; Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 
U.S. 494, 50S (1977); Stanley v.IlIinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (l972); James G. Dwyer, Parents'Religion 
and Children's Welfare: Debwrking the Doctrine of Parents' Rights, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1371. 1418 (l994); 
John H. Garvey, Child, Parent, State, and the Due Process Clause: An Essay on the Supreme Court's 
Recent Work, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 769, 805-07 (1978); Kay P. Kindred, God Bless the Child: Poor 
Children, Parens Patriae, and a State Obligation to Provide Assistance, 57 Omo ST. LJ. 519, 525-26 
(l996). 
109. The Sweaney court's discussion of the cases relied upon by plaintiff-appellant makes it clear 
that none of those cases involved parental corporal punishment of children or announced an express 
constitutional right to carry out such punishment. See Sweaney v. Ada County. 119 F.3d 1385, 1389·91 
(9th Cir. 1997). 
11 O. [d. at 1390. 
Ill. ld. at 1390-92. 
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exists at alI.1l2 The court therefore upheld the deputy sheriffs qualified immunity 
defense and repudiated Sweaney's federal c1aim.lI3 
The most recent case invoking § 1983 on behalf of corporal punishment of 
children is Balden v. Cortee. II' In this case, Blair Balden assaulted his fifteen-year-
old son Benjamin, causing multiple bruises and scratches on the boy's face. liS 
Various state and county employees, including social worker Cathy Cottee, 
investigated the family for child abuse.1I6 During the course of her investigation, 
Cottee ascertain~ that Mr. and Mrs. Balden had used corporal punishment on 
Benjaminll7 and believed in spanking as a child-rearing technique. liS The 
authorities placed Benjamin and his sister in foster care;19 and, pursuant to an 
order of the Chief Referee of the Family Division of Kalamazoo County Circuit 
Court, made the children's return contingent upon the natural parents' compliance 
with certain conditions. l20 The conditions included requirements that the Baldens 
must not use corporal punishment on their childrenl21 and that the family must 
cooperate with the "Families First" program of Family and Children Services of the 
Kalamazoo area. l22 Shari Boone, of the Families First program, required plaintiffs 
to sign the following statement in order to participate in the program:l23 
I fully understand and agree that there is no situation that would 
warrant my physically disciplining any of my children. No matter how 
mad or upset I am, I will not strike them in any fashion. I am to use 
the beeper instead of hitting and I am to use the beeper instead of 
leaving my children alone.124 
The Balden parents ultimately complied with the conditions and resumed custody 
of their children. l2S 
Their compliance was apparently under protest because Mr. and Mrs. Balden 
subsequently responded to these events by filing an action in federal court under §§ 
1983 and 1985126 against the various personnel involved in investigating the 
112. ld. at 1388 (disagreeing with Sweaney's argument "that parents have a federally protected 
constitutional 'right to incorporate reasonable corporal punishment as a manner of disciplining their 
children'"). 
I 13. ld. at 1392-93. 
114. No.4:98-cv-54, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9524 (W.O. Mich. June 22, 1999) (unpublished), affd, 
No. 99-1871.2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 14524 (6th Cir. June 19,2(00) (unpublished table decision). 
lIS. ld. at *2. 
116. ld. at *2-*6. 
117. ld. at *3. 
118. Cf. id. at *3. *5-*6 (stating that Cottee lectured the Baldens about the un acceptability of 
parental corporal punishment, and describing how officials required the Baldens to agree that they would 
not use corporal punishment on their children). 
119. ld. at *4. 
120. ld. at *5. 
121. ld. 
122. [d. 
123. ld. at *6. 
124. ld. 
125. ld. at *5. 
126. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3} (1994). This provision creates a cause of action for damages against those 
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Balden family and removing the children.127 Plaintiffs contended, among other 
things,':za that Cottee violated the Balden's federal constitutional right to corporally 
punish their childrenl29 and that Boone violated their right to decline expression 
of sentiments against corporal punishment of children. l30 Plaintiffs did not specify 
which clause of the Constitution would support a parental right to use this form of 
punishment; they instead vaguely claimed that Cottee's investigation of the spanking 
incidents violated generic "constitutional rights."131 However, plaintiffs apparently 
located the purported right to decline expressing anti-corporal punishment views in 
the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.llz Against Boone, 
[t]hey contend[ed] that their First Amendment rights were violated by 
signing an agreement to principles in which they did not believe. 
Specifically, they assert[ed] that in accordance with their religion, they 
believe[d] that corporal punishment is in some circumstances an 
appropriate disciplinary tool for parents to use in raising their 
children. III 
Finally, plaintiffs also made a related claim under the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment:14 They argued that Cottee's intervention in the Balden 
family constituted invidious discrimination against plaintiffs because of the latter's 
religious belief in spanking children.13S 
The district court issued two opinions in the case, one giving reasons for granting 
Cottee's motion for summary judgment,l16 and the second giving reasons for 
granting the other defendants', including Boone's, motion for summary judgment.137 
In support of her motion, Cottee asserted entitlement to absolute immunity or, in the 
persons who, among other things, conspire to and do deprive plaintiffs of equal protection or of the other 
rights or privileges of a United States citizen. 
127. See Balden, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9524, at "1-"2. 
128. Plaintiffs also claimed, as part of their § 1983 action, that they were deprived by defendants 
of procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Id. at *6. In 
addition, plaintiffs alleged, under § 1985, that defendants conspired to deprive plaintiffs of equal 
protection rights and liberty interests on the basis of defendants' membership in a religious group that 
believed in corporal punishment of children. Id. at "27-*30. 
129. Id. at *24-"26. 
130. See Balden v. Couce, No. 4:98-cv-54, slip op. at 19-20 (W.O. Mich. Feb. II, 1999). 
131. Balden, 1999 U.S. Dist LEXIS 9524, at *24. 
132. See Balden, No. 4:98-cv-54, slip op. at 19-20. The Free Exercise Clause of the First 
Amendment provides, "Congress shall make no law ... prohibiting the free exercise .•• [of rel!gion]." • 
U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
133. Balden, No. 4:98-cv-54, slip op. at 19-20. 
134. Balden, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9524, at *26. The Equal Protection Clause of tile Fourtecnth 
Amendment provides, "nor [shall any state] deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection 
of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I. 
135. Balden, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9524, at "26-"27. 
136. Id. at "1-*30. 
137. Balden, No. 4:98-cv-54, slip op. at 1-24. This opinion also accompanied the court's denial of 
plnintiffs' motion for sanctions. See id. at I, 23-24. 
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alternative, to qualified immunity.138 The court held that Cottee's actions in relation 
to the Balden case entitled her to absolute immunity:39 Although this holding was 
dispositive of plaintiffs' § 1983 claim against Cottee, the court, "[flor the sake of 
completeness[,] ... analyze[d] the qualified immunity defense as well."I.a 
As in Backlund and Sweaney, Cottee's qualified immunity defense hinged upon 
whether she had violated a clearly established federal right of which a reasonable 
person would have known at the time of the supposed violation:41 Because the 
court had already concluded that Cottee deserved absolute immunity, the opinion 
concerning her qualified immunity defense is necessarily dicta. Nevertheless, this 
dicta has significance not only because of its ringing clarity, but also because it is 
reiterated by similar dicta rendered in the separate opinion disposing of Boone's 
motion for summary judgment:42 
The dicta responsive to Cottee is unequivocal: "Plaintiffs have no clearly 
established right to practice corporal punishment,"I43 and, further, there is no 
precedent for the proposition that parents have a constitutional right, clearly 
established or otherwise, to corporally punish children without state intervention.l44 
Also in dicta, the court went on to repudiate plaintiffs' equal protection argument 
on grounds that (1) an investigation of parental spanking is not, by itself, evidence 
of a religiously based animus against those persons who espouse a religious belief 
in spanking; and (2) plaintiffs presented no other evidence of such animus:4s 
Boone did not raise an absolute immunity defense, moving instead for summary 
judgment solely on the basis of qualified immunity!46 The court granted her 
motion inasmuch as the Baldens had "fail[ed] to state a claim of constitutional 
violation."147 The court reasoned that Boone had not coerced Mr. and Mrs. Balden 
into signing the form renouncing corporal punishment; rather, the Baldens elected 
to sign so as to avoid litigation. l48 Thus, the court held that Boone had not 
unconstitutionally suppressed the Baldens' freedom to refrain from falsely declaring 
their repugnance to corporal punishment of children:49 In its opinion, the court 
138. Balden, 1999 U.S. Dist LEXIS 9524, at *7, *10. 
139. [d. at *13. *15-*16. 
140. Id. at *17. 
141. Id. at *18. 
142. Balden, No. 4:98-cv-54, slip op. at 19-23. 
143. Balden, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9524, at *25. 
144. Id. at *25. 
145. Id. at *26-*27. 
146. Balden, No. 4:98-cv-54, slip op. at 15. As mentioned above, Boone was in the employ of the 
Families First program of Family and Children Services of the Kalamazoo area, a private nonprofit 
corporation under contract to provide services to the Kalamazoo County Probate Court - Juvenile 
Division. See id. at I, 16. The district court observed that private individuals utilizing government 
authority are not, ipso facto, thereby entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at 16. Nevertheless, the court 
concluded that the qualified immunity defense should be extended to Boone because doing so would 
serve the traditional purposes of immunity. Id. at 17-19. 
147. Id. at 20. 
148. Id. at 21-22. 
149. Id. 
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again included emphatic dicta that "[p]laintiffs have no clearly established right to 
practice corporal punishment."lso 
Balden's dicta is of a piece with Backlund and Sweaney.J5J In all three cases, 
plaintiffs asserted a constitutional right to spank their children and all three federal 
courts refused to find the existence of such a clearly established right. In Sweaney 
and Backlund, the courts further held that no such right exists at all. Likewise, and 
because of these rulings and pronouncements, the courts spared themselves the 
discredit of inadvertently transforming § 1983 into a vehicle of violence against 
children - a fate, as this article proves, that would be totally at odds with the 
congressional intent undergirding § 1983.152 In this sense, the decisions in these 
cases demonstrate an inextricable linkage between protecting children from a 
constitutionally sanctioned parental power to corporally punish and protecting § 
1983's longstanding role as guardian of societal peace. 
A § 1983 suit was also brought, in part, to promote corporal punishment of 
children in Fowler v. Robinson.J53 This case, however, does not quite fit the 
pattern presented in Backlund, Sweaney, and Balden because the Fowler court, in 
disposing of the corporal punishment claim, did not discuss a qualified immunity 
defense. lS4 This is a major difference because the qualified immunity defense 
necessitates that a court consider whether defendants violated a clearly established 
federal constitutional right of which a reasonable person in defendants' position 
would have known,J5S here, an alleged parental right to corporally punish children. 
In the absence of the defense, a court would not need to address whether the right 
exists unless the legal posture of the case otherwise requires such an analysis, a 
circumstance not presented in Fowler. The subject matter of Fowler and its relation 
to § 1983, nevertheless, bear enough similarity to Backlund, Sweaney, and Balden 
to warrant inclusion of Fowler in this discussion. 
The Fowler case grew out of a family car ride gone bad. Frank Vincent had a 
temper tantrum, refused to wear a seat belt, and kicked his father, and the father 
slapped his son in response. lS6 Subsequently, the child had a large bruise on that 
part of his face where his father had hit him.lS7 The incident came to the attention 
of the child's schoolteacher who reported the father for suspected child abuse.lsH 
County authorities investigated, leading to the arrest and prosecution of Reverend 
1 SO. Id. at 20. 
151. It should be noted that the congruence between Backlund and Balden. on the one hand, and 
Sweaney, on the other hand, is not complete with respect to the existence of a parental constitutional right 
to corporally punish children. Sweaney also offers dicta suggesting that a court taking a broad view could 
construe precedents like Meyer to give rise to the right. See Sweaney v. Ada County, 119 F.3d 1385, 
1390 (9th Cir. 1997). 
152. See supra text accompanying notes 37-67. 
153. No. 94-cv-836, 1996 WL 67994 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. IS, 1996). 
154. Id. at *13-*14. 
155. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text. 
156. Fowler. 1996 WL 67994, at *1. 
157. Id. at *2. 
158. Id. 
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Fowler. ls9 He was acquitted and, with his family, filed a § 1983 action against 
county personnel who had been involved in the matter and against the county 
itself.l60 
Plaintiffs claimed, among other allegations,161 that a county caseworker violated 
their free exercise of religion by advising them that corporally punishing children 
is inappropriate under all circumstances and by requiring the Fowler parents to sign 
a child-care plan disavowing the use of corporal punishment.l62 Plaintiffs main-
tained that, as members of the Church of God, they adhered to Biblical pronoun-
cements allowing parents to corporal1y punish their children in certain situations and 
that accordingly the caseworker's conduct unconstitutionally inhibited practice of 
their religious beliefs.l63 
Defendants moved for summary judgment on the merits of the free exercise cause 
of action,I64 and the court granted the motionl6S by relying on Department of 
Human Resources v. Smith. l66 In Smith, the U.S. Supreme Court had held that, 
with certain exceptions inapplicable to the Fowler case,167 neutral laws of general 
applicability, incidentally burdening a particular religious practice, do not constitute 
a violation of the Free Exercise Clause.16lI The court in Fowler determined that the 
county's policy on corporal punishment, implemented by the case worker, did not 
target religious practices and was merely a generally applicable law incidentally 
imposing on the religiously motivated conduct of these Church of God members. I6\> 
159. ld. at *1. 
160. ld. 
161. In addition to the claims described in the text above, plaintiffs alleged that defendants engaged 
in the following misconduct: false arrest, malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, denial of equal 
protection, denial of due process, violation of liberty rights, failure to intervene, supervisory liability, and 
failure to train and supervise. ld. None of these claims are germane to this article, however. 
162. ld. at *13. 
163. ld. Plaintiffs also made a second free exercise claim that the allegations of child abuse and 
consequent prosecution of Reverend Fowler caused a hostile community reaction that interfered with his 
ability to practice his religion or fulfill his ministerial duties to his church and that even forced the family 
to relocate. ld. 
164. ld. 
165. ld. at *14, *19. 
166. 494 U.S. 872 (1990); Fowler, 1996 WL 67994, at *14. 
167. 494 U.S. at 881-85. In Smith, the Court identified two exceptions to the rule that neutral laws 
of general applicability, incidentally burdening a religious practice, do not violate the Free Exercise 
Clause. One exception is presented by what the Court called a hybrid situation. A hybrid situation arises 
where a plaintiff challenges a law of general applicability not only because it burdens a religious practice 
so as to violate the Free Exercise Clause, but also because the law violates some other constitutional 
protection. In these hybrid cases, the Court has held that such laws violate the Free Exercise Clause 
when the laws also violate another constitutional right. ld at 881-82. The other exception occurs when 
state unemployment compensation rules condition eligibility for benefits upon an applicant's working 
under conditions forbidden by his or her religion. In these unemployment compensation cases, the Court 
has used a balancing test to determine whether the unemployment compensation rules contravene the Free 
Exercise Clause. Under this test, "governmental actions that substantially burden a religious practice must 
be justified by a compelling governmental interest." ld. at 883. 
168. ld. at 878-80, 882, 885, 888-90. 
169. See Fowler, 1996 WL 67994, at *14. 
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If, of course, the court had considered a qualified immunity defense, the court 
would have been obliged to ascertain whether county employees had violated a 
clearly established constitutional parental right to corporally punish children as 
implicit in the Free Exercise Clause. l7o However, the irrelevance of the defense 
rendered that undertaking unnecessary. Smith had relieved the Fowler court of 
responsibility to assess whether such an implied right to spank exists in the Free 
Exercise Clause inasmuch as any incidental imposition on the "right" could not 
cause the county's policies to be invalidated under the clause. Consequently, the 
Fowler court had no occasion to pass upon and did not pass upon the existence or 
nonexistence of a parental constitutional right to corporaUy punish children. The net 
effect is that Fowler, like Backlund, Sweaney, and Balden, represents. another 
instance in which a federal court has been faced with and rejected plaintiffs' 
attempts to use § 1983 in the service of interpersonal violence. 
Section 1983 evidently did not figure into any of these judges' conscious 
reasoning processes. Certainly none of the opinions in these cases manifest that the 
congressional intent behind § 1983 was on these judges' minds. That fact, though, 
does not change the basic anomaly inherent in plaintiffs marshaling § 1983 for 
violent purposes. And it is stiII a saving grace that these judges have found 
themselves, due to the qualified immunity defense or, in the case of Fowler, to Free 
Exercise Clause law, in the more seemly and salutary position of preserving § 1983 
from being turned into a mockery of itself. 
Finally, it should be mentioned that another line of cases exists in which parents 
have relied upon § 1983 to further their perceived power to behave violently with 
their children, but in which cases plaintiffs did not, as in Backlund, Sweaney, 
Balden, and Fowler, assert a constitutional right to corporally punish chiIdren.17I 
These parents were investigated for child abuse, including physical assaults in the 
form of hitting or spanking - classic corporal punishment of children.172 Either 
170. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text. 
171. See. e.g., Farley v. Farley, Nos. 98-6114, 98-6115.2000 WL 1033045. at *1 (6th Cir. July 19. 
2000) (involving. among other things. a husband's alleged whipping of his wife's children); Foy v. 
Holston. 94 F.3d 1528. 1530 (11th Cir. 1996) (arising from. among other things. fathers allegedly hitting 
their daughters); Jenks v. Hull, No. 94-15268. 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 32755, at *6 (9th Cir. Sept. 28. 
1995) (involving a father allegedly hitting his son); DeCosta v. Chabot. 59 F.3d 279, 280 (1st Cir. (995) 
(involving alleged parental corporal punishment of children); Van Emrik v. Chemung County Dep't of 
Soc. Servs., 911 F.2d 863, 864-65 (2d Cir. (990) (deciding case where either the parents or a babysitter 
were suspected of breaking a baby's leg); Hodorowski v. Ray, 844 F.2d 1210, 1212 (5th Cir. 1988) 
(arising from a father allegedly causing bruises on his daughters); Ancona v. Bohara, No. 3:98-CV-1715 
(EBB), 1999 WL 1069537, at *1-*2 (D. Conn. Nov. 9, (999) (arising from a father allegedly hitting and 
kicking his daughter); Sundbye v. Ogunleye, 3 F. Supp. 2d 254, 257 (E.D.N.Y. (998) (involving a 
mother allegedly hitting her daughter); Spencer v. Lavoie, 986 F. Supp. 717, 719 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) 
(involving, among other things, a mother and her boyfriend allegedly striking the former's son and 
daughter); Chayo v. Kaladjian. 844 F. Supp. 163, 166 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (deciding a case in which parents 
were suspected of injuring their daughters' skulls); Charron v. Picano, 811 F. Supp. 768, 770 (D.R.I. 
1993) (involving a father allegedly hitting his son), acq. 692 A.2d 337,337-38 (R.I. 1997); Achterhof 
v. Selvaggio, 757 F. Supp. 837, 838 (W.O. Mich. 1991) (deciding a case in which parents were suspected 
of injuring their daughter's face). 
172. See, e.g., Farley, 2000 WL 1033045, at *1; Foy, 94 F.3d at 1530; Jenks, 1995 U.S. App. 
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in relation to the investigations, removal of their children, and/or institution of child 
abuse proceedings,173 the parents filed § 1983 actions claiming that by such 
measures governmental authorities had violated the following various constitutional 
rights: rights to protection against governmental removal of children from parental 
custody;174 rights to family integrity;17S rights to a relationship with a minor;176 
rights to privacy;177 rights to association;l7B and rights to enjoyment of family 
relations.179 In effect, these plaintiffs may have been seeking constitutional 
insulation of parental violence, but without providing the "justification" that they 
were "only" dispensing corporal punishment. In any event, the courts seem to have 
been comfortable rejecting plaintiffs' various constitutional constructs in these 
contexts and holding in favor of the government.llfO 
In sum, Backlund, Sweaney, Balden, and Fowler represent the emergence of a 
disquieting, although as of yet limited, phenomenon in which parents have sought 
to elevate hitting children to a constitutional art. Plaintiffs have undoubtedly 
LEXIS 32755, at *6; DeCosta, 59 F.3d at 280; Ancona, 1999 WL 1069537, at *1; Sundbye, 3 F. Supp. 
2d at 257; Spencer, 986 F. Supp. at 718; Charron, 811 F. Supp. at 770; if. HodoT(lwski, 844 F.2d at 
1212 (involving a governmentally imposed requirement that parents refrain from corporally punishing 
their children). 
173. E.g., Farley, 2000 WL 1033045, at * 1 (suing in response to removal of children); Foy .. 94 F.3d 
at 1533 (suing to challenge the investigation and removal of children); Jenks, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 
32755, at * 1-*2 (suing in reaction to removal of a child into temporary protective custody on the basis 
of suspected child abuse without a predeprivation hearing); DeCosta, 59 F.3d at 280 (suing over an 
investigation); Van Emrik, 911 F.2d at 865 (suing in response to removal of children); Hodorowski, 844 
F.2d at 1211 (suing to challenge removal of children); Ancona, 1999 WL 1069537, at "'1 (suing in 
response to removal of children); Sundbye, 3 F. Supp. 2d at 257, 261 (suing over the institution of child-
abuse proceedings and threatened and actual removal of children); Spencer, 986 F. Supp. at 721-22 
(suing over removal of children); Chnyo, 844 F. Supp. at 165 (suing to challenge removal and medical 
examination of children); Chnrron, 811 F. Supp. at 770 (suing in relation to removal of children); 
Achterhof, 757 F. Supp. at 838-39 (suing in response to investigation). 
174. E.g., Farley, 2000 WL 1033045, at "'6; Van Emrik, 911 F.2d at 864-65; Ancona, 1999 WL 
1069537, at "'1; Sundbye, 3 F. Supp. 2d at 257; Spencer, 986 F. Supp. at 721. 
175. E.g., Jenks, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 32755, at "'2; DeCosta, 59 F.3d at 280; HIJdIJrtlwski, 844 
F.2d at 1211-12; Chayo, 844 F. Supp. at 171. 
176. E.g., AchterlUlf, 757 F. Supp. at 838-39. 
177. E.g., Foy, 94 F.3d at 1532. 
178. E.g., Achterhof, 757 F. Supp. at 838-39. 
179. E.g., Charron, 811 F. Supp. at 770. 
180. E.g., Foy, 94 F.3d at 1537; Jenks, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 32755, at *2, *6-*10, *13-"14, *19; 
DeCosta. 59 F.3d at 280-81; Van Emrik, 911 F.2d at 864-68; Hodorowski, 844 F.2d at 1211, 1217-18; 
Ancona, 1999 WL 1069537, at *5-*6; Spencer, 986 F. Supp. at 721-23; Chayo, 844 F. Supp. at 168-73; 
Charron, 811 F. Supp. at 773-74, 776; Achterhof, 757 F. Supp. at 837, 840. But see Farley, 2000 WL 
1033045, at *3·"7 (affirming the district court's order denying defendants' summary judgment motions 
on the ground, among others, that government employees violated a mother's substantive due process 
right to immediate physical custody of her children because the employees engaged in arbitrary, vengeful 
conduct toward her); Sundbye, 3 F. Supp. 2d at 261·62, 265-67 (granting defendants' motions for 
summary judgment with respect to, among other claims, plaintiffs substantive due process claim that a 
government employee improperly threatened to remove and coerced the removal of a child from the 
mother's custody and also granting such motions with respect to certain defendants' related qualified 
immunity defenses). 
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proceeded upon the assumption that if hitting is "corporal punishment of children," 
then the attempt to give hitting constitutional status should not seem outlandish or 
inconsistent with constitutional values. Plaintiffs have tried to accomplish this 
transformation by stating causes of action under § 1983, effectively enlisting that 
statute in aid of the very type of violence the statute was enacted to defuse:HI The 
courts thus far have had none 'of it. They have refused to find a constitutional right 
or a clearly established constitutional right in parents to corporally punish their 
children.182 In the process, although probably unwittingly, the courts have refused 
to do violence to § 1983 itself. 
If an adult went to court arguing for a right to hit randomly chosen people, his 
or her claim would seem downright preposterous. It is by denominating the hitting 
as "corporal punishment of children" that plaintiffs have been able to make a right 
to hit children appear legitimate, viable, and normal. The real threat, then, to § 
1983's continued credibility as an agent of peace lies in the parental claim for a 
constitutional right to corporally punish children. The Backlund line of cases 
expresses a singUlar nexus between repUdiating corporal punishment of children as 
a constitutional right and respecting § 1983's very essence. 
Ill. If § 1983 Is Not Preserved as an Agent of Peace, Constitutional Values May 
Be Undermined, Society May Become More Violent, Children May Be 
Demeaned, and Civil Rights Struggles May Be Dishonored 
The process of norm creation flows from the very nature of law:83 Law is 
promulgated to be known; it could hardly restrain or shape people's behavior if the 
contents of laws were kept secret.lI14 By knowing the law, people not only learn 
the kind of rule obedience that is expected of them, but they also learn the 
government's message or opinion on a matter. This message or opinion has an 
extremely strong influence precisely because it carries the imprimatur of the State. 
And an influential message is a pedagogical message - one that has the potential 
to give rise to widely shared values. lIS For example, all states except Minnesota 
181. See supra notes 37-67 rutd accompanying text. 
182. See supra notes 94-152 and accompanying text. 
183. See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARIST011.E 927,952 (W.O. Ross 
trons., Richard McKeon cd., 1941); Plato, Book VII, in THE LAwS OF PLATO 215-16 (Thomas L. Pangle 
Irons. & ed., Basic Books 1980); David R. Barnhizer, Prophets, Priests and Power Blockers: Three 
Fundamental Roles 0/ Judges and Legal Scholars in America, 50 U. PlIT. L. REV. 127, 162-63 (1988); 
Paul Brest, The Thirty-First Cleveland-Marshall Fund Lecture: Constitutional Citizenship. 34 CLEV. ST. 
L. Rev. 175, 177-79 (1986); Keith Burgess-Jackson, Bad Samaritanism and the Pedagogical Function 
0/ Law, 8 CRIM. JUST. J. 1,3-4,26 (1985); Ralph Lerner, The Supreme Court as Republican School-
master, 1967 SUP. cr. REV. 127, 180; Anne Norton, Transubstantiation: The Dialectic o/Constitutional 
Authority, S5 U. CHI. L. REV. 458, 468-69 (1988); Philip Soper, The Moral Value 0/ Law, 84 MICH. L. 
REV. 63, 85 (1985). 
184. Robert H. Bork has remarked that "[I]aw is a public act." ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING 
OF AMERICA: THE Pol.mCAI. SEDUCTION OF THE LAw 144 (1990); see also GEORGE HEGEl., 
PHILOSOPHY OF RIGIIT 135 (T.M. Knox trans., Oxford Univ. Press (967) (noting the importance of 
knowledge of the law). 
185. See Bitensky, supra note 79, at 441; Susan H. Bitensky, Theoretical Foundations/or a Right 
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currently permit "reasonable" parental corporal punishment of children.l86 This 
means that in forty-nine states, the law is already fostering a normative environment 
favorable to such punishment. 
to Education Under the U.S. Constitution: A Beginning to the End oj the National Education Crisis, 86 
Nw. U. L. REV. 550, 635-36 (1992). 
186. Some commentators assert that all states permit parents or guardians to administer "reasonable" 
corporal punishment upon children. See Leonard P. Edwards, Corporal Punishment and the Legal 
System. 36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 983, 984-85 (1996); Mary Kate Kearney, Substantive Due Process 
and Parental Corporal Punishment: Democracy and the Excluded Child, 32 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1,22 
& n.l25, 29 (1995); if. Franklin E. Zimring, Legal Perspectives on Family Violence, 75 CAL. L. REV. 
521,526 (1987) (stating that "the physical discipline of children is typically insulated from legal review 
if it does not represent a gross threat to the child"). 
Many states have accomplished this end by enacting statutory language specifically authorizing 
corporal punishment of children by their parents or guardians. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13a-3·24(1) 
(1994); ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.430(a)(I) (Michie 2000); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13·403(1) (West 
1989); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-605(1) (Michie 1997); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-703(1)(a) (2000); CONN. 
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-18 (West 1994); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit II, § 468 (1995); GA. CODE. ANN. § 19-
15-1(3)(A) (Supp. 1998); HAW. REV. STAT. § 703-309(1) (1999); IDAHO CODE § 16-2002 (Michie 1979 
& Supp. 2000); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-34-1-15 (Michie 1997); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 503.IIO(I) 
(Michie 1999); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:18 (4) (West 1997); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 106(1) 
(West 1983); MD. CODE. ANN. FAM. LAW § 4-501(b)(2) (Supp. 1999); MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 
750.136(b) (West 1991 & Supp. 2000); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-105(m) (2000); Mo. REV. STAT. § 
210.110(1) (19% & Supp. 2001); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 627:6(1) (1996 & Supp. 2000); N.Y. PENAL 
LAW § 35.10(1) (McKinney 1998); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-05(1) (1997 & Supp. 1999); OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § 2151.03.1(8) (Anderson 1998); 12 OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 844 (West 1983); OR. REV. STAT., 
§ 161.205(1) (1999); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 509(1) (West Supp. 1998); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-
490(3)(a) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 2000); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-18-5 (Michie 1998); TEX. FAM. CODE 
ANN. § 26I.ool(I)(C) (Vernon 1996 & Supp. 2001); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-4D1(1)(c) (1999); WASH. 
REV. CODE § 26.44.015 (1997 & Supp. 2001); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.45 (West 1996 & Supp. 2000). 
Other states have also legitimated "reasonable" parental corporal punishment by judicial decision. See, 
e.g., State V. Arnold, 543 N.W.2d 600, 603 (Iowa 1996) (,,[Pjarents have a right to inflict corporal 
punishment on their child, but that right is restricted by modemtion and reasonableness."); Carpenter V. 
Commonwealth, 44 S.E.2d 419, 423 (Va. 1947) ("Courts are agreed that a parent has the right to 
administer such reasonable and timely punishment as may be necessary to correct faults in his growing 
children."). 
At first glance, Minnesota also appears to have a statute permitting parental corporal punishment of 
children. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.06(1)(6) (West 1987 & Supp. 2001) (allowing reasonable force 
"[w]hen used by a parent, guardian, teacher or other lawful custodian of a child or pupil, in the exercise 
of lawful authority, to restrain or correct such child or pupil"); see also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 
609.379(1)(a) (West 1987 & Supp. 2001) (same). However, Minnesota precludes the use of reasonable 
force, including corporal punishment, as a defense to assault charges, while defining assault so as to 
encompass corporal punishment. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 709.379(2) (West 1987 & Supp. 2001) 
(authorizing the use of reasonable force as a defense to certain criminal offenses, not including assault); 
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.224(1)(1)(2) (West 1987 & Supp. 2001) (defining assault as an act committed 
"with intent to cause fear in another ofimmediate bodily harm or death" or the actual infliction of bodily 
harm); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.02(7) (West 1987 & Supp. 2001) (defming bodily harm as "physical 
pain or injury, illness, or any impainnent of physical condition"). The upshot is that if parents use 
reasonable force, such as physical chastisement, on a child as a disciplinary measure, they may be 
prosecuted by Minnesota for assault and may not hide behind the excuse that they were just using 
"reasonable" corporal punishment. For a more detailed analysis of Minnesota's statutory scheme in 
relation to corporal punishment of children, see Victor 1. Vieth, Corporal Punishment in the United 
States: A Calljor a New Approach to the Prosecution ojDisciplinarians, 15 J. Juv. L. 22, 41-45 (\994). 
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Giving constitutional status to a practice, however, exalts it in a way that no other 
domestic law can do because the federal Constitution represents the paramount law 
of the land.l87 Americans cherish the Constitution; it is "the only law that we 
virtually worship as a nation" and "the only law that has attained almost the status 
of scripture."ln Were the courts to accept plaintiffs' arguments in Backlund, 
Sweaney, Balden, and Fowler asserting a parental constitutional right to physically 
chastise children, the courts would exalt the practice and import a normative lesson 
that parental corporal punishment is of eminent and virtually unassailable social 
acceptability. The result would be that, over time, even more children would be hit, 
causing immediate physical painll!9 and possible long-term physiologicaJl90 and 
psychological harm to those who were hit.19I The potential for psychological harm 
should especially catch the nation's attention. The development of pervasive mental 
disorders may give rise to adverse mass social psychology, the prevention of which 
warrants particular solicitude for § 1983 as an agent of peace, even beyond sparing 
individual children the rod. It is thus essential to acquire some understanding of the 
effects of corporal punishment of children. 
It is self-evident that smacking causes pain; by definition, corporal punishment 
187. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493-95 (1954) (striking down state laws that 
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (l 
Crnnch) 137, 176-80 (1803) (invalidating a federal law that conflicted with Article 111 of the 
Constitution). 
188. Laurence H. Tribe, The Constitution,in the Year 2011, 18 PAC. L. J. 343,344 (1987); see also 
ALLAN BLOOM, THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN MIND 55 (1987) (describing the "national reverence 
for our Constitution"). 
189. See infra text accompanying notes 196-205. 
190. See infra notes 216-26 and accompanying text. 
191. See infra notes 212-16 and accompanying text. Shortly before this article was published, Dr. 
Diana Baumrind, a child development expert at the University of California, gave a speech asserting "that 
social scientists had overstepped the evidence in claiming that spanking caused lasting harm to the child." 
Erica Goode, Findings Give Some Support to Advocates o/Spanking, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2001, at A6. 
Although she does not advocate corporal punishment of children, she also claims that her research shows 
"that mild to moderate spanking ... [has] no detrimental effects." Id. However, Dr. Baumrind's study 
has not yet been published and is, at the time of this writing, in the process of being reviewed. 
Corrections, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2001, at A2. 
Other child development experts have already begun to criticize the science behind the Baumrind 
study. See, e.g., E-mail from Dr. Eli H. Newberger, Professor at Harvard Medical School and pediatrician 
at Children's Hospital, Boston, to Susan Bitensky, Professor of Law, Michigan State University - Detroit 
College of Law (Aug. 31, 2001, 05:06 ESn (on file with author) ("Not only is the Baumrind study 
flawed by small numbers and inadequate controls, but she does not deal with the most important 
implications of spanking for character development, particularly for boys."); Murray Straus, Comments 
on Baumrind's Data (Aug. 27, 2001), at hup:llnospank.org/strauslO.htrn (last visited Sept. 10, 2001) 
(censuring Baumrind's findings because she used too small a sample of cases for a longitudinal study and 
because six previous longitudinal studies did find that corporal punishment of children results in harmful 
effects). It also bears mentioning that Dr. Baumrind's study, whatever its scientific soundness or lack 
thereof, completely ignores the moral objections to corporal punishment of children as well as the fact 
that such punishment is considered a violation of international human rights law. See, e.g., Susan H. 
Bitensky, Spare the Rod. Embrace Human Rights: International Law's Mandate Against All Corporal 
Punishment o/Children, 21 WmrnER L. REV. 147, 148-58 (1999); Bitensky, supra note 79, at 388-421, 
435-40. 
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serves the purpose of controlling or modifying conduct through infliction of bodily 
suffering.l92 Spanking may also cause physiological damage precisely because 
such punishment involves a threat to invade and an invasion of bodily integrity.193 
Spanking may also induce delayed somatic responsesl94 and may easily deteriorate 
into more serious child abuse.19s Less well known outside of child development 
and related fields, corporal punishment may also give rise, during childhood, to a 
host of psychological disorders such as aggression,t96 lack of empathy,197 an-
192. See JAMES DoBSON. THE STRONG-WILLED CHILD: FROM BIRTIlnIROUGH ADOLESCENCB 47 
(1978); J. RICHARD FuGATE, WHAT THE BIBLE SAYS ABOUT ... CHILD TRAINING 136 (1980); PHILIP 
GREVEN. SPARB THE CHILD: niB RELIGIOUS ROOTS OF PUNISHMENT AND TIlE PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT 
OF PHYSICAL ABUSE 122-23 (1991); STRAUS. supra note 13. at 5. 7.9-10. 
193. See PENELOPE LEACH. YOUR GROWING CHILD: FROM BABYHOOD nIROUGH ADOLESCENCB 
225 (1995) (noting that "an unexpectedly large minority of smacked children eventually suffer actual 
injury" such as from blows accidentally landing on the spine or which catch a child off balance); PETER 
NBWELL, CHILDREN ARB PEoPLE Too: THE CASE AGAINST PHYSICAL PUNISHMENT 31-32 (1989) 
(canvassing a range of "accidental" injuries that corporal punishment can produce. including a burst ear 
drum. whiplash injury to the spine. and injuries to the chest. abdomen. buttocks. and genitals); David 
Orentlicher. Spanking and Other Corporal Punishment o/Children by Parents: Overvaluing Pain. Under-
valuing Children. 35 Hous. L. REv. 147. 156 (1998) (stating that corporal punishment may result in 
inadvertent injuries when the child attempts to avoid being struck or when the parent punishes a baby 
without taking into account the unique vulnerability of infancy). 
194. It has been suggested that corporal punishment of children may lead to headaches and 
stomachaches. See IRWIN A. HYMAN. READING. WRmNG. AND TIlE HICKORY STICK: THB ApPALLING 
STORY OF PHYSICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL ABUSB IN AMERICAN SCHOOLS 95. 100 (1990). 
195. See NBWELL, supra note 193. at 21-31; WILLIAM SBARS & MARTHA SEARS. THB DISClPLlNB 
BOOK: EVERYTIlING You NEED TO KNOW TO HAVB A BETIER-BEHAVED CHILD - FROM BIRTH TO AGB 
TEN 149 (1995); DAVID A. WOLFE, CHILD ABUSE: IMPLICATIONS FOR CHILD DBVELOPMENT AND 
PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 51 (Developmental Clinical Psychology and Psychiatry Series No. 10. 1987); 
Richard J. Gelles, Violence Toward Children in the United States. in CRmCAL PERSPECTIVES ON CHILD 
ABUSE 53.75 (Richard Bourne & Eli H. Newberger cds .• 1979); Kenelm F. McCormick. Attitudes 0/ 
Primary Care Physicians Toward Corporal Punishment. 267 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 3161. 3161 (1992); 
Orentlicher. supra note 193. at 156; Elizabeth Ann Gibbons. Note. Surveying Massachusetts' Child Abuse 
Laws: The Best Protection/or Children? 26 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 107. 112 (1992). 
196. See LBACH. supra note 193. at 224 (observing thilt spanking children is instrumental in making 
them bullies); JANE NBLSEN liT AL.. PosmVB DISCIPLINE A-Z: 1001 SOLUTIONS TO EVERYDAY 
PARENTING PROBLEMS 164-65 (1993) (noting that corporal punishment of children encourages them to 
strike others); NANCY SAMALlN, LoVING YOUR CHILD Is NOT ENOUGH: POSmVE DISCIPLlNB THAT 
WORKS 73 (1987); ROBERT R. SBARS BT AL.. PATIERNS OF CHILD RBARING 266 (1957); SEARS & 
SEARS. supra note 195. at 154 (predicting that the more frequently children are subjected to spanking. 
the more probable it is that they will aggress toward others); BENJAMIN SrocK. DR. SrocK ON 
PARENTING 152 (1988); STRAUS, supra note 13. at 22. 100; FEUCITY DB ZULUETA, FROM PAIN TO 
VIOLENCE: niB TRAUMATIC ROOTS OF DESTRUCTIVENESS 218 (1993); Leonard D. Eran. Parent-Child 
Interaction. Television Violence, and Aggression cifChildren, 37 AM. PSYCHOL. 197.203.208 (1982); 
Norma D. Feshbach, The Effects 0/ Violence in Chi/dIu10d. 2 J. CLINICAL CHILD PSYCHOL. 28, 29-30 
(1973); Orentlicher. supra note 193. at 158; if. Bruce D. Perry. Incubated in Terror: Neurodevelopmental 
Factors in the "Cycle 0/ Violence," in CHILDREN IN A VIOLBN1' SOCIETY 124. 126. 135. 138 (Joy D. 
Osofsky ed .• 1997) [hereinafter Peay. Incubated in Terror] (explaining how a child's brain will develop 
a predisposition for violence when the child is repeatedly exposed to violent or fear-inducing situations). 
But see DOBSON. supra note 192. at 34-35 (maintaining that reasonable corporal punishment administered 
by a loving parent actually deters children's misbehavior); Diana Baumrind. Parenting: The Di.~cipline 
Controversy Revisited. 45 FAM. REL. 405. 410. 412-13 (1996) (opining that spanking does not cause 
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tisocial behavior;91 depression,l9'1 anxiety,200 tension,lDl and withdrawal.2t12 
Some of these disorders may persist into or surface during adulthood.203 The 
manifestation of increased aggression and decreased empathy during adulthood is 
of particular interest for purposes of this article, because these are the very traits 
that constitute a predisposition to commit violent crimes and even crimes against 
humanity. If enough people are corporally punished as children and develop this 
predisposition as adults, society as a whole will have a tendency to become 
correspondingly more prone to and tolerant of violence.204 In short, if courts were 
to accept plaintiffs' claims in Backlund-type cases of a parental constitutional right 
to spank children, § 1983 would be reduced to a travesty. It would be a vehicle of 
violence not only against children, but a vehicle for promoting societal violence 
across the board. Section 1983 would simultaneously engender and be engulfed by 
the very syndrome it was enacted to stop. 
children to exhibit increased aggressiveness). 
197. See GREVEN. supra note 192. at 127-29 (theorizing that a child who is hurt by his or her 
parents will develop an inability to feel empathy); Feshbach. supra note 196. at 30; see aLw ALICE 
MILLER. BREAKING DoWN niE WAIL OF SILENCE: THE LIBERATING EXPERIENCE OF FACING PAINFUL 
TRUTH 88 (Simon Worrall trans .• Dutton Books 1991) [hereinafter MILLER. BREAKING DOWN niE WAIL] 
(describing how beatings by his parents during childhood were a factor contributing to Hitler's later 
callousness); cf. Bruce D. Perry et al .• Childlwod Trauma. the Neurobiology of Adaptation, and "Use-
dependent" Development of the Brain: How "States" Become 'Traits," 16 INFANT MENTAL HEALni 1. 
271, 278-84 (1995) [hereinafter Perry et al .• Childhood Trauma] (elucidating how. in the face of chronic 
trauma, a young child's brain may evolve from the adaptive state of dissociation to a maladaptive trait 
of continuing dissociation or numbness). 
198. Murray A. Straus et al .• Spanking by Parents and Subsequent Antisocial Behavior of Children. 
151 ARCmvES OF PEDIATRICS & ADOLESCENT MED. 761. 764-67 (1997); Orentlicher. supra note 193, 
at 158-59. 
199. See HYMAN. supra note 194, at 94. 99-100; AUCE MILLER, THE DRAMA OF niE GIFI'ED CHILD 
43 (1994) [hereinafter MIlLER. DRAMA OF THE GIFI'ED CHILD]; NEWELL, supra note 193. at 46; Dean 
M. Herman. A Statutory Proposal to Prohibit the Itifliction of Violence upon Children. 19 FAM. L. Q. 
I, 18-19 (1985); Lawrence S. Wissow & Debra Roter, TeIWard Effective Discussion of Discipline and 
Corporal Punishment During Primary Care Visits: Findingsfrom Studies of Doctor-Patient Interaction, 
94 PEDIATRICS 587, 588 (1994). But see David Benatar, Corporal Punishment. 24 Soc. THEORY & 
PRAC. 237. 243 (1998) (critiquing Murray Straus's findings that corporal punishment can lead to 
childhood depression). 
200. See GREVEN. supra note 192. at 122-23; HYMAN. supra note 194, at 94,99-100; Orentlicher, 
supra note 193. at 157; if. Bruce D. Perry, Anxiety Disorders, in TEXTBOOK OF PEDIATRIC NEUROP-
SYCmATRY 579. 586 (C. Edward Coffey & Roger A. Brumback eds., 1998) [hereinafter Perry, Anxiety 
Disorders] (stating that inasmuch as the young child's brain "organizes ... in a 'use-dependent' manner." 
children who undergo "traumatic experiences will develop anxiety-regulation problems"). 
201. See HYMAN. supra note 194, at 95, 100; if. Herman, supra note 199, at 39 (observing that 
spanking places children in a relationship of continuing fear of their parents). 
202. See GREVEN. supra note 192, at 129; HYMAN, supra note 194, at 94, 100; SEARS & SEARS. 
supra note 195, at 148. 152. 
203. See infra text accompanying notes 212-16. 
204. See GREVEN. supra note 192. at 193-204; MILLER, BREAKING DoWN niE WALL, supra note 
197, at 88-94; AuCE MILLER, FOR YOUR OWN GOOD: HIDDEN CRUELTY IN CHILD-REARING AND THE 
ROOTS OF VIOLENCE 62. 66. 115-16. 172 (Hildegarde & Hunter Hannum trans., 1990) [hereinafter 
MILLER. FOR YOUR OWN GOOD]; Bitensky, supra note 79, at 432-35; cf. Perry, Incubated in Terror, 
supra note 196. at 127, 144-45. 
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Indeed, many believe that childhood corporal punishment may produce an adult 
predisposition for violence because children, upon being struck, are not permitted 
to vent the rage and humiliation they feel.20s Children may repress these feelings 
due to a variety of circumstances. It may seem, from the child's viewpoint, a 
perilous course to show anger toward the adults upon whom the child depends206 
and with whom the child usually identifies.207 It may also be inconceivable, 
particularly to younger children, that parental punitiveness could be inappropriate 
or unjust.lOS Nor can very young children and babies accurately conceptualize 
spanking so as to respond consciously to it.209 
This quiescence may provide the child with a momentary escape in the face of 
imminent danger, but the child and society ultimately can pay a high price for this 
defense mechanism. Quiescence does nothing to diminish the child's hurt and 
resentment and many children have no alternative but to repress such feelings.2 lo 
Psychologist Alice Miller has explained the dynamic as follows: 
If there is absolutely no possibility of reacting appropriately to hurt, 
humiliation, and coercion, then these experiences cannot be integrated 
into the personality; the feelings they evoke are repressed, and the need 
to articulate them remains unsatisfied, without any hope of being 
fulfilled . 
. . . What becomes of this forbidden and therefore unexpressed anger? 
Unfortunately, it does not disappear, but is transformed with time into 
205. Children are apt to feel angry and humiliated when they are spanked. See GREVEN, supra note 
192, at 124-27, 132; LEACH, supra note 193, at 224; MIlLER, BREAKING DOWN THE WALL, supra nole 
197, at 92-94; SEARS & SEARS, supra note 195, at 147, 152; STRAUS, supra note 13, at 69. 
206. See GREVEN, supra note 192, at 132 (observing that a child cannot afford to react with anger 
toward a punitive parent "on whom he or she depends for nurturance and life itself'); MIlLER, DRAMA 
OF THE GIFI'ED CHILD, supra note 199, at 8; ALICE M1Il.ER, THOU SHALT NOT BE AWARE: SOCIETY'S 
BETRAYAL OF THE CIllLD 6 (1984) [hereinafter MILLER, THou SHALT NOT BE AWARE]; J. KONRAD 
STETTBACHER, MAKING SENSE OF SUFFERING: THE HEALING CONFRONTATION WITH YOUR OWN PAST 
27-28 (1991). 
207. See GREVEN, supra note 192, at 132 (theorizing that children suppress anger in response to 
hurtful discipline administered "by adults whom the child loves"); ALICE MIlLER, BANISHED 
KNOWLEDGE: FACING CHILDHOOD INJURIES 98-105 (1988) (explaining that the child identifies so 
thoroughly with the punishing parent that the child cannot comprehend when the parent is wronging the 
child); ALICE MIlLER, PICTURES OF A CIllLDHooD 4-5 (1986) (suggesting that because children love their 
parents the former tend to absolve the latter from responsibility for cruelty to the children); STRAUS, 
supra note 13, at 163 (remarking upon the difficulty of acknowledging that corporal punishment is 
destructive since such an acknowledgment may mean condemning one's own parents). 
208. See MILLER, BREAKING DoWN THE WALL, supra note 197, at 19-20,55; MIlLER, FOR YOUR 
OWN GOOD, supra note 204, at 59, 61, 74, 247-48. 
209. See GREVEN, supra note 192, at 19; STElTBACHER, supra note 206, at 28; Herman, supra note 
199, at 21. 
210. See GREVEN, supra note 192, at 126; MILLER, FOR YOUR OWN GOOD, supra nole 204, at 7, 
61; ALICE MIlLER, THE UNTOUCHED KEy: TRACING CHILDHOOD TRAUMA IN CREATIVITY AND 
DESTRUCTIVENESS 159-60, 168 (1990) [hereinafter MILLER, THE UNTOUCHED KEY]; STRAUS, supra nole 
13, at 69; Herman, supra note 199, at 19. 
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a more or less conscious hatred directed against either the self or 
substitute persons, a hatred that will seek to discharge itself in various 
ways permissible and suitable for an adult.11l 
367 
After years of simmering intrapsychically, the repressed hostility can emerge in 
some adults in personality disorders characterized by destructiveness either toward 
the self or toward others.lIZ Indeed, this childhood repression may be a root cause 
of adult aggressiveness,ll3 lack of empathy,ll4 and authoritarianism/Is conditions 
that cause the victim to act out the repressed anger at the expense of family, friends, 
or the community. 
This theoretical construct explaining the correlation between childhood corporal 
punishment and adult aggression is arguably supported by recent neurobiological 
studies. According to neurobiologist Dr. Bruce D. Perry, a child's developmental 
experiences determine the organization and functioning of the adult brain.116 When 
a child is traumatized, his or her brain adapts with physiological hyperarousal and/or 
dissociation.lI7 If these adaptive states are repeated, they can become maladaptive 
211. MILLER. FOR YOUR OWN GOOD, supra note 204, at 7,61. 
212. See GREVEN, supra nole 192, at 128-74, 186-212; MILLER. BREAKING DoWN THE WALL, supra 
note 197. at 82, 94-95; SEARS & SEARS. supra note 195. at 153-54 (enumerating negative long term 
effects of spanking such as aggressive behavior and an increased rote of perpetrating abuse on a child 
or spouse); STRAUS, supra note 13, at 67-146; Herman, supra note 199. at 25,36-39; Wissow & Roter. 
supra note 199. at 587-88. 
213. The anger repressed in childhood is acted out or repeated during adulthood as aggression 
against others who are perceived as sUlTOgates for the once punitive parents. See GREVEN, supra note 
192, at 126-27; MILLER, BREAKING DOWN THE WALl., supra note 197. at 91, 108; MILLER, FOR YOUR 
OWN GOOD. supra note 204, at 61, 65-66, 115-17, 172; SEARS & SEARS, supra note 195. at 153-54; 
Herman, supra note 199. at 36; see also STRAUS. supra note 13, at 99. 103, 106, 110. 113-15 (describing 
the linkages between receiving corporal punishment and later engaging in criminal conduct). 
214. See GREVEN, supra note 192, at 127-29 ("The parent who hurts a child while imposing 
discipline is teaching a lesson in indifference to suffering .... H); MILLER. FOR YOUR OWN GOOD, supra 
note 204. at 79-83, 115; if. MILLER. DRAMA OF THE GIFTED CHILD. supra note 199. at 34 (theorizing 
that when the child is compelled to adapt to parental needs, through corporal punishment or otherwise, 
what results is the impossibility of experiencing "consciously certain feelings of his own ... either in 
childhood or later in adulthood"). 
215. See GREVEN. supra note 192. at 198-204; MILLER, BREAKING DOWN THE WALL, supra note 
197. at 84-85; MILLER, TfJE UNTOUCHED KEY, supra note 210, at 50-52, 60. 62,68, 149 (tracing the 
despotism of Stalin and other authoritarian personalities to beatings received in childhood. unaccom-
panied by adult sympathy for the child's pain); NEWELL, supra note 193, at 46; Herman. supra note 199, 
at 38-39 (remarking that an "authoritarian personality" can be "correlated with past subjection to corporal 
punishment"). 
216. See, e.g., Perry. Anxiety Disorders. supra note 200, at 588-89; Perry. Incubated in Terror, 
supra note 196, at 128-31; Bruce D. Perry & Jennifer E. Pate, Neurodevelopment and the 
Psychobiological Roots of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, in THE NEUROPSYCHOLOGY OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS: A PRAcnCAL GUIDE 129, 131-35 (Leonard F. Koziol & Chris E. Stout eds., 1994); Bruce 
D. Perry. Neumbiological Sequelae of Childhood Trauma: PTSD in Children, in CATECHOLAMINE 
FUNcnON IN POST-TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER: EMERGING CONCEPTS 233. 239-40 (M. Murberg ed .• 
1994) [hereinafter Perry. Neumbiological Sequelae]; Perry et a1., Childlwod Trauma, supra note 197, at 
274-83; Bruce D. Perry & Ishnella Azad, Posttraumatic Stress Disorders in Children and Adolescents, 
11:4 PEDIATRICS 310, 310-12 (1999). 
217. See Bruce D. Perry & Ronnie Pollard, Homeostasis, Stress, Trauma, and Adaptation: A 
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traits that the child will carry into adulthood.2lK The resulting mature brain, in 
other words, may be in a continuing state of vigilance and/or dissociative numbness 
regardless of the presence of external threats. The "'sensitized' hyperarousal 
response" in particular may set the stage for reenactment of early traumatic 
experiences.219 People victimized by violence during childhood may be inclined 
to respond violently as adults to any perceived or misperceived threats.22il In this 
"states-to-traits" neurobiological process, 
[T]he chronic overactivation of neurochemical responses to threat in the 
central nervous system, particularly in the earliest years of life, can 
result in lifelong states of either dissociation or hyperarousal. In the 
case of hyperarousal, overdevelopment of the stress response systems 
in the brainstem and mid-brain alters the development of the higher 
cortical functions, creating a predisposition to behave in aggressive, 
impulsive, and reactive ways.221 
Neurodevelopmental View of Childhood Trauma, 7 CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRIC CUNICS OF N. 
AM. 33. 40-46 (1998); Perry. Incubated in Terror. supra note 196, at 135-39; Perry & Pate, supra note 
216. at 133-34. 136-37; Perry et al .• Childhood Trauma. supra note 197, at 274.277-85. "Dissociation 
is a broad descriptive term that includes a variety of mental mechanisms involved in disengaging from 
the external world and attending to stimuli in the 'internal' world." Perry & Pollard. supra. at 43. "It can 
involve distraction. avoidance. numbing. daydreaming, fugue. fantasy. derealization. depersonalization. 
and, in the extreme. fainting or catatonia." Id. Hyperarousal consists of the body's preparation to fight 
against or flee from a potential threat. See id. at 41. 
218. See Perry. Anxiety Disorders. supra note 200. at 586-89; Perry et al.. Childhood Trauma •. vupra 
note 197. at 274-85; Perry. Neurobiological Sequelae. supra note 216. at 237-41; Perry & Pollard, supra 
note 217. at 35-45; Perry. Incubated in Terror. supra note 196. at 129-31. 136; Perry & Pate. supra note 
216, at 132-37; Perry & Azad. supra note 216. at 310-11. 
Whether maladaptive permanent states of hyperarousal or dissociation ultimately form may also be 
contingent on the presence of other factors. In other words. the permanence of these states is the result 
of trauma in complex combination with other variables. For example. the age of the child when a trauma 
occurs may be a factor. See Perry et aI .• Childhood Trauma, supra note 197, at 283; Perry & Pate. supra 
note 216. at 136. The particular genetic composition of a child may contribute to "certain properties of 
sensitivity of the arousal system." Perry. Anxiety Disorders. supra note 200. at 585. "[Elarly life 
trauma/stress plays an important role as an expresser of genetically determined vulnerabilities to a variety 
of neuropsychiatric disorders." Perry. Neurobiological Sequelae. supra note 216. at 249. The interference 
of a protective or supportive caregiver may also be influential in the outcome of the "states-to-traits" 
process. See Perry & Pate. supra note 216. at 138; Perry & Azad. supra note 216. at 310. 
Psychoeducational and critical incident debriefing can also minimize the development of irreversible 
sensitization of the alarm reaction. See Perry & Pate. supra note 216, at 139. 
219. See Perry. Anxiety Disorders, supra note 200, at 582; cf. Perry. Incubated in Terror. supra note 
196. at 135-38 (explaining the dynamic that children exposed to chronic violence will tend later to react 
aggressively because their brains have maladapted into a persistent state of fear). 
220. See Perry. Incubated in Terror. supra note 196. at 141-42. 145; Bruce D. Perry. Neurodevelop-
mental Adaptations to Violence: How Children Survive the Intragenerational Vortex of Violence, in 
VIOLENCE AND CHILDHOOD TRAUMA: UNDERSTANDING AND RESPONDING TO THE EFFECTS OF VIOLENCE 
ON YOUNG CHILDREN 67. 67-68 (1995) [hereinafter Perry, Neurodevelopmental Adaptations]; Perry & 
Azad. supra note 216. at 312; if. Perry. Neurobiological Sequelae. supra note 216. at 239 (stating that 
the neurophysiological activation seen during acute stress may not be reversible if the stressful event is 
of sufficient duration. intensity. or frequency). 
221. ROBIN KARR-MoRSE & MEREDITH S. WILEY. GHOSTS FROM THE NURSERY: TRACING niE 
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Children may undergo many obvious traumas. Severe child abuse, car accidents, 
or loss of a parent come readily to mind. It is important to consider, however, 
whether there are more mundane practices towards children that are also traumatic 
but not evaluated as such by the adult world because these practices are longstan-
ding and are not perceived from the child's vantage point of vulnerability and 
dependency. Children may, in fact, respond to even garden-variety corporal 
punishment as a traumatic event.222 Spanking necessarily involves infliction of fear 
and pain,223 violation of bodily integrity, and degradation,224 experiences likely 
to be interpreted as threatening to body and soul in the most primal way.22S Hence, 
spanking, like more obvious traumas, has the potential to initiate those states in the 
brain that will lead to permanent adult traits of hyperarousal, dissociation, or both. 
Spanking may program the brain for a propensity toward violence and/or a lack of 
feeling.226 
ROOTS OF VIOLENCE 168 (1997). 
222. See GREVEN, supra note 192, at 137, 147, 156-57; STRAUS, supra note 13, at 9-10; Herman, 
supra note 199, at 21; cf. MILLER, DRAMA OF THE GIFTED CHILD, supra note 199, at 78-79 (discussing 
the intensity of feelings unique to young children). 
223. See DoBSON, supra note 192, at 47; FuGATE, supra note 192, at 136; GREVEN, supra note 192, 
at 122-23; NEWELL, supra note 193, at 12; STRAUS, .rupra note 13, at 5:7, 9-10; Feshbach, supra note 
196, at 29-30. 
224. See JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 73-74 (1979); 
MILLER, FOR YOUR OWN GOOD, supra note 204, at 17; NEWELL, supra note 193, at 12; SEARS & SEARS, 
supra note 195, at 152. But see DoBSON, supra note 192, at 84 (maintaining that corporal punishment 
can and should be used so as not to break the child's spirit). Some who favor corporal punishment of 
children see its value precisely in that it humbles the child. See, e.g., FuGATE, supra note 192, at 139; 
see also David Benator, Corporal Punis~nt, 24 SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 237, 241-42 (1998) (que-
stioning whether corporal punishment degrades children). 
225. Psychologist Alice Miller has described cruel child.rearing practices, including corporal 
punishment, as perpetrating "soul murder" on children. See MILLER, FOR YOUR OWN GOOD, supra note 
204, at 223, 232; see also MILLER, THOU SHALT NOT BE AWARE, supra note 206, at 310-11 (noting how 
wounding beatings are to children). 
226. Dr. Bruce Q. Perry, whose neurobiological studies have confirmed a relationship between 
childhood trauma and impaired brain development, including a propensity toward violence, repeatedly 
includes as one such trauma victimization of children by domestic violence or domestic battery. See, e.g., 
Perry et al., Childhood Trauma, supra note 197, at 273 (domestic violence); Perry & Pollard, supra note 
217, at 34 (domestic violence); Perry, Incubated in Terror, supra note 196, at 126 (domestic battery); 
Perry, Neurodevelopnumtal Adaptation.f, supra note 220, at 67, 68 (domestic battery); Perry & Azad, 
supra note 216, at 311 (domestic violence). He has also included under the rubric of childhood trauma 
incidents where children witness violence but are not its direct victims. See, e.g., Perry, Neurobiological 
Sequelae, supra note 216, at 234; Perry & Azad, supra note 216, at 313. 
As a common sense matter, the term "domestic violence" would seem to encompass corporal 
punishment of children since this form of punishment consists of hitting and violating bodily integrity. 
Corporal punishment of children also fits all of the elements of a domestic battery. See Bitensky, supra 
note 79, at 435-36, 442-46. Moreover, if merely witnessing violence is enough to traumatize children 
so as to lead to distortions in the developing brain, then experiencing violence in the form of corporal 
punishment would logically appear to involve the same damaging potential. This seems true since Dr. 
Perry has acknowledged that a factor in children's development of posttraumatic stress disorder, a 
condition originating in the brain's response to trauma, is the degree to which children's bodily integrity 
is threatened. See Perry, Neurobiological Sequelae, supra note 216, at 236. 
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If enough children are spanked - and many still are227 - the result may be a 
high percentage of adults prone toward violence as each generation matures. 
Research on the brain's adaption to fear during childhood has even yielded evidence 
that this adaption "may actually become encoded in the genes and passed on to new 
generations, which may become successively more aggressive."m It is thus 
conceivable that adults who were corporally punished as children may pass on 
hypervigilance and/or dissociation to their offspring, whether or not the latter are 
ever traumatized themselves.229 
The point is this: a great deal is at stake in any future cases in which parents try 
to state a § 1983 cause of action asserting a constitutional right to corporally punish 
their children. If the courts do not continue to repudiate such claims, the very nature 
of the human race could be altered to become more violent and less empathetic. At 
best, there would be a greater number of violent people among us if the courts were 
to elevate spanking to a federal constitutional status. More widespread violence 
leads to a nation on a retrogressive trajectory, in opposition to the values of human 
dignity and ordered liberty - values inherent in our constitutional regime.230 And 
Dr. Perry, however, has indicated that not all corporal punishment will produce this type of traumatic 
effect: 
[O]f course domestic assault can be very traumatizing for the witnessing child. And some 
forms of corporal punishment can be as well - however, not all corporal punishment is 
traumatizing - it is ineffective as a discipline technique, a terrible way to model problem 
solving and has a host of negative effects on children but those are not always due to 
"trauma." There are ... many flavors and grades of corporal punishment. 
E-mail from Dr. BruceD. Perry, Chief of Psychiatry, Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences, 
Baylor College of Medicine and Texas Children's Hospital, to Susan H. Bitensky, Professor of Law, 
Michigan State University-Detroit College of Law (Nov. 6, 2000) (on file with author). 
This view of corporal punishment is generally consistent with Dr. Perry's assessment of all violence 
against children: 
All violent behavior impacts the children in its wake, but there is heterogeneity of impact. 
Important factors in the differential impact on the developing child include the type of 
violence, the pattern of violence, the presence (or absence) of supportive adult caretakers 
and other support systems, and, of key importance, the age of the child .... 
Perry, Incubated in Terror, supra note 196, at 124, 127. 
That is, violence against children, including corporal punishment, mayor may not give rise to trauma 
and ensuing adverse consequences for brain development, depending upon the presence or absence of 
various contextual factors. 
227. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
228. KARR-MoRSE & WILEY, supra note 221, at 169. 
229. See id. 
230. See, e.g., Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 308 (1986) (referring to "our 
system of ordered liberty" as a concomitant of the right to due process of law); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 
U.S. 399, 406 (1986) (stating that the Eighth Amendment protects "fundamental human dignity"); 
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983) (declaring that the "Constitution is designed to maximize 
individual freedoms within a framework of ordered liberty"); Whisenhunt v. Spradlin, 464 U.S. 965, 969 
(1983) (dissenting opinion from denial of certiorari) (describing ordered liberty as a constitutional 
concept); United- States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. I, 14-15 (1973) (observing that the Fourth Amendment 
protects human dignity); Schmerberv. California. 384 U.S. 757, 769-70 (1966) (asserting that the Fourth 
Amendment protects human dignity); cj. Woodson v. North Carolina. 428 U.S. 280, 304 (I976) 
(remarking that a "fundamental respect for humanity" underlies the Eighth Amendment). 
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§ 1983? Section 1983 would become a means of oppression against children and 
an engine of social disintegration and of the further brutalization of American 
culture. Section 1983, as an agent of peace, would cease to exist. The loss of this 
role for § 1983 may seem trifling in comparison to the long-tenn harm that would 
be done to public health and safety if plaintiffs ever prevailed in Backlund-type 
suits. But § 1983 is laden with an historical and emotional significance that would 
make its loss as an agent of peace of fateful import even beyond deterring the 
evolution of an increasingly violent society. 
Section 1983, it should be remembered, has lofty origins as postbellum America's 
early mandate against vigilante-style violence toward blacks and white 
Republicans.231 The Ku Klux Klan and other paramilitary organizations during 
Reconstruction made whipping their weapon of choice.232 In so doing, the Klan 
operated in the tradition of slaveholders who more often than not showed 
displeasure with their "property" by flogging.233 Our country has, to put the matter 
simply, a long and despicable history of whites hitting blacks with impunity. 
Even before the Union victory, some refonners made the connection between 
corporal punishment of children and corporal punishment of slaves. To these 
abolitionists' way of thinking, such punishment of children and slaves alike 
constituted unacceptable violence resulting from children's and slaves' common 
status as chattel.234 Once the slaves were freed, § 1983 functioned as a counter-
weight to the continuation of this shameful tradition vis-a-vis black adults and their 
white adult allies.235 It being 1871 when § 1983's predecessor statute was enacted, 
legislators were concerned with rectifying the fallout from the Civil War. Children's 
right to be protected from violence was not and could not, given the historical 
framework, have been on the legislative agenda. 
Nevertheless, it would be an expression of the utmost disrespect for the struggles 
against violence during Reconstruction to allow § 1983 now to be used as the 
vehicle for establishing a constitutional right to corporally punish children. The 
inevitable inference would be that § 1983 cannot serve the same protective function 
for children as the statute had served for freedmen and freedwomen and that 
children are chattel unworthy of the protection accorded blacks. Section 1983's long 
and venerable history in the deliverance of blacks from violence would be 
dishonored, and the children of the present era would be relegated by law to a status 
commensurate with slaves and the hapless victims of the Ku Klux Klan. 
Conclusion 
An unsettling phenomenon has emerged in the type of litigation coming before 
the federal courts: cases have been surfacing in which parents rely upon § 1983 to 
state a cause of action based on the claim that a parental constitutional right to 
231. See supra notes 37-67 IlI1d accomplll1ying text. 
232. See supra notes 3-10 IlI1d accompanying text. 
233. See supra notes 3-10 and accompanying text. 
234. See supra notes 14-15 IlI1d accomplll1ying text. 
235. See supra notes 37-63 IlI1d accomplll1ying text. 
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corporally punish their children has been abridged.236 Thus far, federal judges have 
denied these plaintiffs' claims either because, under the doctrine of qualified 
immunity, there is no established or clearly established parental constitutional right 
to spank children237 or because there were other grounds for deciding the case not 
related to the asserted right.23B 
These cases represent not only an attempt to constitutionalize a fonn of 
interpersonal violence, but also an assault on § 1983's mission as an agent of 
interpersonal peace. The Congress that enacted § 1983's predecessor statute, section 
I of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, intended the statute as a deterrent to night riders' 
violent transgressions, especially their countless whippings of blacks and white 
Republicans in the South.239 The U.S. Supreme Court and many commentators 
have repeatedly acknowledged the congressional intent to keep the peace that 
prompted section 1 's enactment and the continued relevance of that intent to § 
1983.240 
Were the federal courts to accept parents' assertion of a constitutional right to 
corporally punish children, the courts would unwittingly run roughshod over this 
legislative intent and impoverish § 1983 by turning it into an agent of violence 
rather than of peace. The results would be destructive in at least three ways. First, 
the courts would, in effect, create a nonn of the highest order sanctioning 
interpersonal violence against children. Second, because violence against children 
tends to produce more aggressive and less empathetic adults,241 society as a whole 
would become more violent and destructive of the constitutional values of human 
dignity and ordered liberty. Third, § 1983 and the struggles to end violent 
discrimination against blacks would be slighted and children would be devalued in 
the process. Fortunately, the federal courts have thus far rejected parents' claims for 
a right of corporal punishment, or, in one case, have not had to reach the issue at 
aU.242 
All states, save one, continue to permit "reasonable" parental corporal punishment 
of children.243 But corporal punishment has not yet been accorded a constitutional 
dimension and § 1983's historic meaning has not yet been abused so as to enable 
corporal punishment to acquire such a dimension. Section 1983, in keeping with its 
tradition of protecting blacks from the more violent badges of slavery, still continues 
as children's, and indeed our entire society's, inveterate agent of peace. 
236. See supra Part II. 
237. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text. 
238. See supra notes 156-71 and accompanying text. 
239. See supra notes 37-63 and accompanying text. 
240. See supra noles 64-66 and accompanying lext. 
241. See supra notes 196-216 and accompanying text. 
242. See supra Part II. 
243. See supra nole 186 and accompanying text. 
